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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF GEORGIA’S
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD TO
DETERMINE INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY IN
CAPITAL CASES
Lauren Sudeall Lucas*
ABSTRACT
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that execution of
people with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In doing so, the Court
explicitly left to the states the question of which procedures would be
used to identify such defendants as exempt from the death penalty.
More than a decade before Atkins, Georgia was the first state to bar
execution of people with intellectual disability. Yet, of the states that
continue to impose the death penalty as a punishment for capital
murder, Georgia is the only state that requires capital defendants to
prove their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt at the
guilt phase of the trial to be legally exempted from execution.
This article is the first to provide an empirical assessment of
Georgia’s “guilty but mentally retarded” (GBMR) statute, including
its beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. In doing so, it fills a
critical gap not only in the scholarly literature on the subject, but also
for those who continue to litigate the issue. Its analysis reveals that
no defendant facing the death penalty in Georgia has ever received a
GBMR verdict for malice murder from a jury in the statute’s nearly
*

Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. For their hard work and perseverance in
collecting data on capital cases from across the entire state and tracking such information electronically,
I would like to thank graduate research assistants Jobena Hill, Daniel Richardson, and Kaitlyn (Welch)
Nigro. Jobena Hill and Darcy Meals also deserve credit for the background research they contributed to
this article and their work on the appendix. All of the information included in this article represents the
best effort we could make toward painting as clear a picture as possible of how the Georgia statute has
applied in practice to capital defendants in jury trials. Gathering that information was a herculean effort
spanning multiple years that would not have been possible without the assistance of multiple lawyers,
clerks, and court personnel, for which I am incredibly grateful. Last, I would like to thank the editors of
the Georgia State University Law Review for their work on the piece, and Dean Steven J. Kaminshine
and the Georgia State University College of Law for the resources that made this research possible.

553

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2969802

554

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

thirty-year existence. Prior to Atkins, only one capital defendant had
ever received a GBMR jury verdict at trial, in a felony-murder case,
by meeting this extremely high standard of proof, thus exempting
herself from the death penalty.
The absence of any successful GBMR jury verdict in a malice
murder case and the absence of any successful GBMR verdict in any
capital case post-Atkins, in combination with Georgia’s lone status in
imposing such a procedure, all contribute to the argument that the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and the jury’s decision
regarding intellectual disability in the guilt phase create, in the words
of the Court, an “unacceptable risk” that capital defendants with
intellectual disability will be executed in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court declared in Atkins v.
Virginia that the execution of people with intellectual disability 1
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.2 In doing so, the Court expressly left the procedures to
be used in identifying intellectual disability to the states.3 In the wake
of Atkins, states developed varying standards for the definition of
intellectual disability; the evidence that a sentencer may consider in
making the determination whether a capital defendant is intellectually
1. A note regarding terminology: Both the Atkins opinion and the Georgia statute use the language
“mentally retarded.” In Hall v. Florida, the Court acknowledged the change in terminology in the
mental health community since its decision in Atkins and announced that it would now use the term
“intellectual disability.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). The author also recognizes the
stigma attached to the outdated term and does not endorse its use. Except when referring specifically to
standards established by legislatures or courts using that language, this article instead uses the term
“intellectual disability.”
During the 2017-2018 session, the Georgia legislature passed House Bill 343, which would
amend the Official Code of Georgia such that all references to “mental retardation” and “mentally
retarded” would be changed to reference “intellectual disability.” As of April 7, 2017, this bill was
awaiting the Governor’s signature. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 343, Bill Tracking,
http://legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-us/display/20172018/HB/343.
2. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
3. Id. at 317 (“As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), with regard to
insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’”).
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disabled; and the procedures, including the standard of proof, by
which that determination must be made. Among those states, Georgia
stands alone as the only state to require that a defendant claiming
constitutional exemption from the death penalty based on intellectual
disability, must prove that disability beyond a reasonable doubt at the
guilt phase of a capital trial. This article provides, for the first time,
an empirical assessment of Georgia’s guilty but mentally retarded
(GBMR) statute.
Part I provides an overview of the legal backdrop for this project.
It reviews the history of the Georgia statute, its accompanying
standard of proof, and the legal challenges posed to that standard in
both state and federal court. It also highlights other cases suggesting
that the following facts—that every other state has refused to adopt
such a standard, that not one defendant in Georgia has ever met this
standard in a case of malice murder, and that not one defendant has
met the standard in any case following the Atkins decision—are
highly relevant to an analysis of whether Georgia’s GBMR statute
violates the Eighth Amendment.
Part II introduces the empirical analysis of how capital defendants
seeking an exemption on the basis of their intellectual disability in
Georgia have fared under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
It describes the immediate need for such a study, illustrated most
poignantly by the Warren Hill case, the methodology used in
conducting the analysis, and the results of the study. Based on this
analysis, and on the best documentation obtainable, the study
concludes that no defendant since Atkins has successfully proven to a
jury in a capital trial that he meets the criteria for intellectual
disability. Only one defendant in Georgia in the statute’s nearly
thirty-year history has been able to successfully prove before a jury
that she is intellectually disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.
Part III explores in further detail cases in which the issue of
intellectual disability was asserted at the trial level, to illustrate
reasons why the Georgia statute has failed in practice to protect those
with intellectual disability from the death penalty. Because it has
become nearly impossible to prove intellectual disability to a jury at
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trial, Georgia’s GBMR statute has created the unacceptable risk that
defendants with intellectual disability will be executed in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
I. GBMR in Georgia: The Legal Landscape
The Georgia statute creating the procedure by which capital
defendants with intellectual disability must prove an exemption from
the death penalty, referred to herein as the GBMR statute, has been
the subject of considerable litigation and public debate in its nearly
thirty-year history. Part I.A provides historical background and an
overview of the statute establishing that standard, and Part I.B
summarizes the most recent legal challenges to Georgia’s beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. In Part I.C, the article provides some
context as to the current climate regarding challenges to other state
procedures used to determine intellectual disability in capital cases
and provides a backdrop for why this study, demonstrating the
overwhelming inability of capital defendants in Georgia to prove
their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt post-Atkins, is
critical to the constitutional analysis of Georgia’s statute.
A. History of the Georgia GBMR Statute
Although an outlier in imposing such a high standard of proof and
in placing the determination of intellectual disability at the guilt
phase of the trial, Georgia was also the first state to outlaw execution
of people with intellectual disability. 4 The statute was enacted in
response to public outrage over the execution of Jerome Bowden,
who had an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 59 and could not count to
ten.5 The General Assembly opted to address the issue by tacking an
additional option on to the list of possible pleas in Georgia Code
section 17-7-131, which governs pleas of insanity and
4. Veronica M. O’Grady, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The Constitutionality of Georgia’s Burden
of Proof in Executing the Mentally Retarded, 48 GA. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (2014).
5. Id.; see also Raymond Bonner, Argument Escalates on Executing Retarded, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 23,
2001), https://nyti.ms/2nXRXEJ (“The first state to pass a law to protect the mentally retarded was
Georgia, largely because of a public outcry following the execution in 1988 of Jerome Bowden.”).
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incompetency.6 As amended, the statute offers defendants the option
to plead “guilty,” “not guilty,” “not guilty by reason of insanity”
(NGRI), “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI), and “guilty but mentally
retarded” (GBMR). 7 Upon receiving a verdict of GBMR, a capital
defendant would receive a life sentence. 8 Georgia’s definition of
intellectual disability adopted by the legislature closely tracked the
definitions established by the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) and the manual published by the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) (formerly the
American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)). With only
slight variations, each definition outlines three criteria that must be
met for a diagnosis of intellectual disability: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) significant deficits in adaptive
behavior; and (3) onset in the developmental period.9
One result of the decision to incorporate the issue of intellectual
disability into this part of the Georgia Code—and, accordingly, into
the finding of guilt—is that the same standard of proof was applied to
the finding that a defendant is intellectually disabled. The statute
requires a jury to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged and is mentally retarded.”10
A year after the statute was enacted, in the case of Fleming v. Zant,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the execution of people with
intellectual disability violated the Georgia constitution’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment.11 Son Fleming was tried prior to
July 1, 1988, the effective date of the GBMR statute, but sought the
benefit of the exemption from the death penalty, as a man with an
6.
7.
8.
9.

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 (2016).
Id. § 17-7-131(b).
Id. § 17-7-131(j).
See id. § 17-7-131(a)(3); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 31 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]; AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD MANUAL].
10. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (emphasis added).
11. Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga. 1989). It did so, finding a consensus among Georgia
citizens against the execution of those with intellectual disability even after the United States Supreme
Court declined to recognize a national consensus. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339 (1989).
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intellectual disability. The Court announced the new constitutional
rule under Georgia law as well as a procedure for those defendants,
like Fleming, who were tried before the statute’s enactment. Under
the Court-created procedure, those defendants raising an intellectual
disability argument in the post-conviction setting would only bear the
lesser “burden of proving retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence” before a jury.12
At Warren Hill’s capital trial in 1991, his lawyers failed to raise
the issue of his intellectual disability at trial. In post-conviction
proceedings, Hill sought to use the procedure announced in Fleming
to have his claim of intellectual disability determined under a
preponderance of the evidence standard by a jury. The Georgia
Supreme Court held in Turpin v. Hill that the standards set forth in
Fleming were “not applicable to mental retardation claims raised in
cases tried after the effective date of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) and
(j)” and required Hill to present his intellectual disability claim to the
habeas court, subject to a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.13 Even
though the Georgia Supreme Court previously ruled that
preponderance of the evidence would suffice for those cases
involving offenses preceding the statute’s effective date,14 it declined
to find the statute unconstitutional. With its rulings in Fleming and
Hill, the Court, in effect, created a multi-tiered system for
consideration of intellectual disability claims in Georgia: defendants
whose crimes occurred before July 1, 1988, faced a lower burden of
proof than those whose crime occurred after the statute’s effective
date, who would face the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof.
For the latter group, those who raised intellectual disability at trial
would have their claim decided by a jury at the guilt phase via the
GBMR verdict, while defendants who had not raised the claim at trial
would have the claim heard on its own—in other words, without
being tied to any consideration of culpability—by a judge in postconviction proceedings.15
12.
13.
14.
15.

Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 342–43.
Turpin v. Hill (Hill I), 498 S.E.2d 52, 53–54 (Ga. 1998).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Hill I, 498 S.E.2d at 53–54. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected equal protection and due
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Neither the Georgia legislature nor the Georgia courts made any
change to the state’s procedure exempting those with intellectual
disability from the death penalty following the Atkins decision. In
light of Atkins, however, Warren Hill again challenged the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in the Georgia Supreme Court and gave
the court its first opportunity to review the constitutionality of the
standard under the federal constitution. 16 In Hill’s case, the court
below ruled that Georgia’s beyond a reasonable doubt standard did
not satisfy the constitutional demands of Atkins and that Hill should
be subject to the Fleming procedure. Relying on the Atkins Court’s
delegation to the states to “develop[] appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction,” the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and
upheld Georgia’s beyond a reasonable doubt standard as
constitutional. 17 The court likened intellectual disability claims to
claims of insanity during the commission of a crime, in which
context the United States Supreme Court had upheld the application
of a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.18
The court again upheld the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
Stripling v. State. 19 As in Hill, the court compared the burden of
proof in intellectual disability claims to that of insanity claims. The
Georgia court also emphasized that the Supreme Court in Atkins had
counted Georgia as “part of the national consensus regarding the
treatment of mentally retarded defendants” and it would have been
“illogical” to conclude both that Georgia was part of the national
consensus supporting the categorical exemption of such defendants
from the death penalty while simultaneously imposing a standard that
violated the same rule.20 Last, the court relied upon the fact that other
process challenges to defendants facing different procedures on the same issue. Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at
341.
16. Head v. Hill (Hill II), 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2003).
17. Id. at 620 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)).
18. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (finding requiring accused to prove claim of
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt standard did not violate due process).
19. Stripling v. State, 711 S.E.2d 665, 669 (Ga. 2011).
20. Id. at 668 (emphasis in original). This analysis should not be given substantial weight, however,
as the Atkins Court, in mentioning Georgia’s and other states’ statutes, was simply tallying the number
of states that had legislatively exempted those with intellectual disability from capital punishment, not
sanctioning any particular state procedure. Florida’s statute, too, was mentioned in Atkins as among the
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states had imposed a standard of proof higher than preponderance of
the evidence in adopting a clear and convincing standard and
ultimately refused to view the preponderance standard as
constitutionally required.21
Even so, Georgia is an outlier. Georgia is currently—and has
always been—the only state to impose a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard in determining intellectual disability in a capital case and the
only state that requires that the determination occur in tandem with
the jury’s consideration of the defendant’s guilt. Post-Atkins, of the
thirty-three jurisdictions—thirty-one states, the federal government,
and the military—that retain the death penalty, nineteen states apply
a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, 22 four states apply a
first states to exempt those with intellectual disability from the death penalty, but Hall made clear that
such a “fleeting mention did not signal the Court’s approval of the State’s current understanding of its
law.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (2014). Significantly, the Atkins Court did not mention or
address Georgia’s beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, only citing Georgia’s Code section
17-7-131(j), which exempts those with intellectual disability from the death penalty. Atkins, 536 U.S. at
313–14. In addition, on its face, Georgia’s statute could be read so as not to require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt on the question of intellectual disability but only on the question of guilt. See
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2016) (“The defendant may be found ‘guilty but mentally retarded’ if the
jury, or court acting as trier of facts, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged and is mentally retarded.”) (emphasis added).
21. Stripling, 711 S.E.2d at 668 (finding “persuasive” the fact that “sister states . . . have refused to
declare the preponderance of the evidence standard to be constitutionally required”); id. at 669
(“Georgia was not alone in defining mental retardation through the use of a heightened standard of proof
at the time of Atkins, as several states by that time had already established that a defendant must prove
mental retardation under a clear and convincing evidence standard.”).
22. Alabama (Morrow v. State, 928 So. 2d 315, 323–25 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (declining to
establish specific procedures for trial courts to evaluate Atkins claims, instead adopting the procedures
outlined in Rule 32, which governs post-conviction claims)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618
(2016)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2016)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A(3)(i)
(2016)); Indiana (Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 99-103 (Ind. 2005) (although IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-36-9-4 refers to a clear and convincing standard, the Indiana Supreme Court appeared to deem this
standard unconstitutional in Pruitt); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, 532.135, 532.140
(West 2016))); Louisiana (LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2016)); Mississippi (Chase v.
State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)(1) (West 2016));
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(4) (West 2016)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 174.098(5)(b) (LexisNexis 2016)); Ohio (State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002));
Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 63 (Pa. 2011)); South Carolina (Franklin v.
Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. 2003)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3
(2016)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2016)); Texas (Ex parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d
815, 816–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104 (LexisNexis 2016));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2016)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030
(West 2016)). Before Maryland abolished the death penalty, it, too, applied a preponderance of the
evidence standard. See Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d 1, 3 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1991); MD. CRIM. CODE
§ 2-202 (repealed Oct. 1, 2013).
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“clear and convincing evidence” standard,23 two states apply a “clear
and convincing evidence” standard pretrial and a “preponderance of
the evidence” standard at sentencing,24 and seven jurisdictions have
not imposed any explicit standard of proof for determining
intellectual disability. 25 Not one state has followed Georgia’s
statutory scheme in implementing the Atkins decision.26
In 2013, spurred on by disability advocates and lawyers
demanding a change to the statute, the House Judiciary Non-Civil
Committee of the Georgia General Assembly held an informational
hearing regarding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, primarily
for “educational purposes,” while the legislature was out of session.27
Testimony provided during the hearing revealed that the conflation of
the beyond a reasonable standard and the finding of intellectual
disability was a result of careless drafting. While the statute was
intended to set the standard for a finding of guilt at “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the decision to merely tack on “mentally retarded”
at the end of a sentence inadvertently applied the same standard of
proof to that separate finding.28
23. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(G) (2016)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1.3-1102 (2016)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (2016)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.137 (West 2016)). Florida’s procedure for assessing intellectual disability claims was struck down
as unconstitutional as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014), but the Court did not address the standard of proof.
24. North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2005 (2016)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21
§ 701.10b (2016)). Under both statutes, during the pretrial determination made by the judge, the
defendant is held to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard; during the sentencing phase, where the
jury makes the determination, the defendant is held to a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2005; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.10b.
25. Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6622 (West 2016) (no standard provided by statute)); Montana
(no statute or case); New Hampshire (no statute or case); Oregon (no statute or case); Wyoming (no
statute or case); United States military (no statute or case); United States federal government (18 U.S.C.
§ 3596(c) (2012)); see also Jessica Hudson, Kyle Fralick & John A. Sautter, Lighting but No Thunder:
The Need for Clarity in Military Courts Regarding the Definition of Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases and for Procedures Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 359, 381–85 (2008)
(arguing that a pretrial determination of intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence would
be consistent with Military procedure and practice); Timothy R. Saviello, The Appropriate Standard of
Proof for Determining Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases: How High Is Too High?, 20 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 163, 171 n.50 (2015) (explaining that the five states with no explicit standard have executed
so few defendants that they may not have faced a claim of intellectual disability).
26. See infra Appendix.
27. O’Grady, supra note 4, at 1192–93.
28. Id. at 1202–03 n.97 (citing testimony of Jack Martin).
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B. Warren Hill and the Eleventh Circuit
As noted above, though the GBMR defense was available at the
time of his 1991 trial, Warren Hill’s trial attorneys failed to raise the
issue of intellectual disability.29 In state post-conviction proceedings,
Hill alleged that he should be exempt from the death penalty due to
his intellectual disability and that his trial lawyers were ineffective in
failing to present the claim at trial. 30 The Georgia Supreme Court
allowed Hill to proceed on his intellectual disability claim in postconviction proceedings in order “to avoid a miscarriage of justice,”
but ordered the habeas court to evaluate it using the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.31 On remand, the habeas court found that
Hill had proven his intellectual functioning deficits beyond a
reasonable doubt but could not satisfy the same burden of proof with
regard to his adaptive functioning deficits. 32 One month after the
court’s order, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins.33 Hill
moved for reconsideration, and the habeas court ruled that in light of
Atkins, Hill was entitled to a jury’s consideration of intellectual
disability 34 using the preponderance of the evidence standard. 35
Specifically, the court ruled that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard “creat[ed] ‘an extremely high likelihood of erroneously
executing mentally retarded defendants by placing almost the entire
29. Hill I, 498 S.E.2d 52, 53–54 (Ga. 1998).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Order at 4–6, Hill v. Head, No. 94-V-216 (Ga. Super. Ct. Butts Cty. May 13, 2002). The court’s
finding that Hill could not meet the second criteria for intellectual disability—deficits in adaptive
functioning—relied on, among other things, the fact that Hill had held various jobs and provided for his
family—things that people with intellectual disability in the mild range can do. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT.
EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. RESEARCH, THE POST-HIGH SCHOOL OUTCOMES OF YOUNG
ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES UP TO 8 YEARS AFTER HIGH SCHOOL 55 (2011), https://ies.ed.gov/ncser/
pubs/20113005/pdf/20113005.pdf (noting that 76.2% of people identified as intellectually disabled by
the school system had been employed at some point since high school). That people with intellectual
disability cannot hold jobs or provide for their family members are among common, and unfounded,
stereotypes about this population. AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
USER’S GUIDE: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 25–26 (11th ed. 2012) [hereinafter AAIDD USER’S GUIDE
2012].
33. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
34. The court ordered a jury trial in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Habeas
Corpus Relief at 6, Hill v. Head, No. 94-V-216 (Ga. Super. Ct. Butts Cty. Nov. 19, 2002).
35. Id. at 13.
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risk of error upon the defendant.’” 36 The court expressed concern
about the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, given Hill’s placement
fell within the mild range of intellectual disability, as opposed to the
moderate or severe ranges. 37 Thus, the court found Hill’s was an
“exceptionally close” case putting him at “special risk” for an
erroneous determination. 38 In contrast, the habeas court found that
Hill met the criteria for intellectual disability by a preponderance of
the evidence.39 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
habeas court’s adoption of the Fleming-like procedure and affirmed
its prior, pre-Atkins holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard applied to all defendants tried after the statute’s effective
date.40
Warren Hill then turned to the federal courts. Before a divided
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
Hill prevailed on his claim that Georgia’s beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof violated the Eighth Amendment’s categorical
prohibition of the death penalty for people with intellectual disability,
as the standard “necessarily will result in the deaths of mentally
retarded individuals.”41 On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, finding that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) the Georgia court’s holding was not
“contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the controlling
Supreme Court precedent.” 42 The court emphasized that given the
very strict deference due to state court decisions under AEDPA,
Hill’s case was the improper vehicle for the court to be considering a
constitutional challenge to Georgia’s beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof:

36. Hill v. Schofield (Hill III), 608 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting trial court order),
rev’d en banc, Hill v. Humphrey (Hill IV), 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Habeas Corpus Relief at 9, Hill v.
Head, No. 94-V-216 (Ga. Super. Ct. Butts Cty. Nov. 19, 2002).
40. Hill II, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620–21 (Ga. 2003)
41. Hill III, 608 F.3d at 1277.
42. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1360.
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If the standard of proof Georgia has adopted for claims of
mental retardation is to be declared unconstitutional, it
must be done by the Supreme Court in a direct appeal, in an
appeal from the decision of a state habeas court, or in an
original proceeding filed in the Supreme Court.43
In rejecting Hill’s claims, the majority took issue with the dissent’s
finding that Georgia’s statute effectively foreclosed Atkins relief to
capital litigants.44 The court found:
[N]o evidence in this record to support the proposition that
the reasonable doubt standard triggers an unacceptably high
error rate for mental retardation claims. Whether a burden
of proof scheme will result in an unacceptably high error
rate is, in part, an empirical question that we are illequipped to measure in the first instance. There is no data
on this question in this record.45
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review, thereby
exhausting Hill’s appeals. 46 The State of Georgia scheduled his
execution. 47 Seeing the news of Hill’s imminent execution,
psychologist Thomas Sachy, who had testified for the prosecution in
earlier proceedings that Hill did not meet the criteria for intellectual
disability, contacted Hill’s attorney.48 Dr. Sachy was concerned that
he had made an error in his prior diagnosis due to lack of experience.
Upon closer review, he found that Hill did meet the criteria.49 Dr.
Sachy’s new determination led two other State experts to reconsider
their prior opinions rejecting a diagnosis of intellectual disability for
43. Id. at 1361.
44. See id. at 1356.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Hill v. Humphrey (Hill V), 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012).
47. Press Advisory, Att’y Gen. Samuel S. Olens, Ga. Dept. of Law, Execution Date Set for Warren
Lee Hill, Convicted of Murdering a Fellow Prison Inmate (Jan. 16, 2015), http://law.georgia.gov/pressreleases/2015-01-20/execution-date-set-warren-lee-hill-convicted-murdering-fellow-prison.
48. In re Hill (Hill VI), 715 F.3d 284, 288–89 (11th Cir. 2013).
49. Id.
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Hill.50 Now all three State experts agreed that Hill did, in fact, qualify
for the diagnosis. 51 Hill filed a successive habeas petition in state
court with this new information. 52 Unsuccessful, he again sought
federal review, but his claims were rejected.53 Hill then sought again
to file a successive habeas petition in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hall v. Florida.54 Again, his efforts were unsuccessful.55
Despite widespread pleas from mental health advocates, the
American Bar Association, former President Jimmy Carter, the
Vatican, the U.S. delegation of the European Union, and countless
others, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles denied clemency.56
Georgia executed Warren Hill on January 27, 2015, though every
mental health expert who evaluated him agreed that he was a man
with an intellectual disability.57
C. Current Arguments Against The Statute—And Why Its Impact
Matters
While Atkins left to the states the question of how to implement its
prohibition against execution of people with intellectual disability,
that opening does not provide the states with license to violate the
Eighth Amendment by allowing such death sentences and executions
to occur.58 Georgia’s GBMR statute, and its accompanying standard
of proof, raise the thorny question whether a procedure ostensibly
used to implement Atkins’s holding59 might be so severe, or flawed,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 303.
52. Id. at 248.
53. Id. at 301.
54. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014); In re Hill (Hill VII), 777 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th
Cir. 2015).
55. Hill VII, 777 F.3d at 1226.
56. Rhonda Cook, Georgia Executes Intellectually Disabled Man, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 27,
2015, 8:16 PM), http://www.myajc.com/news/georgia-executes-intellectually-disabled-man/
nVPnhYjGDYir3B45jKuF6N/.
57. Id.
58. Hill IV, 662 F.3d 1335, 1370 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[A] State cannot create
procedures that effectively eviscerate a substantive constitutional right, but rather ‘must provide
procedures which are adequate to safeguard against infringement of [the] constitutionally protected right
[].’” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958))).
59. Although Georgia’s statute was enacted before Atkins was decided, the Atkins Court’s decision
to leave procedures for implementing its holding to the states has since been used on multiple occasions
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that it fails to screen out those who are, under Atkins, ineligible for
the death penalty.
In recent years, the Court has made clear that its deference to states
in Atkins was not intended to allow any conceivable state procedure
for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases. And, it has
demonstrated a willingness to correct states that have taken that
license too far. For example, in Hall v. Florida, the Court held that,
as interpreted by that state’s highest court, a Florida law that
foreclosed further exploration of a capital defendant’s intellectual
disability if his IQ score was higher than 70 violated the Eighth
Amendment. 60 The Florida Supreme Court interpreted Fla. Stat.
§ 921.137(1) to mean that “a person whose test score is above 70,
including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not
have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other
evidence that would show his faculties are limited.”61 Of concern to
the Court was the fact that a defendant scoring above the mandatory
IQ score cutoff of 70 would be precluded—and thus the sentencer
precluded from considering—”substantial and weighty evidence of
intellectual disability” that the medical community accepts as
probative of intellectual disability, including for defendants with an
IQ over 70.62 The Court held that Florida’s “rigid rule” “create[d] an
unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be
executed” and was therefore unconstitutional.63
The Hall Court also noted that a significant majority of states
chose to implement Atkins by taking the “standard error of
measurement” (SEM) into account in assessing intellectual
disability.64 Because an individual’s IQ score on any given exam may
fluctuate for various reasons, the Court recognized “the reality that an
to justify the constitutionality of the Georgia statute. See, e.g., Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1347–48 (explaining
that because Atkins expressly left the procedures for determining “mental retardation” to the states, it
provides no support for Hill’s argument that Georgia’s standard is unconstitutional). The Court’s recent
decision in Hall v. Florida, discussed below, undermines the viability of this argument.
60. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014).
61. Id. at 1994.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1990 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1995–96.
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individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single
numerical score” and that “an individual’s score is best understood as
a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.”65 The Court,
relying on current professional standards, also emphasized that an
individual’s adaptive functioning “is central to the framework
followed by psychiatrists and other professionals in diagnosing
intellectual disability.” 66 In contrast, Florida law was based on an
understanding of IQ test scores as fixed and, on that basis, barred
from court any other evidence of intellectual disability.67 The Court
viewed the decision by almost every other state to have considered
the issue after Atkins to reject the strict 70 cutoff as “‘objective
indicia of society’s standards’ in the context of the Eighth
Amendment” and a conclusion that Florida’s standard was neither
“proper [n]or humane.” 68 In ultimately striking down Florida’s
standard as unconstitutional, the Court emphasized, “Atkins did not
give [the States] unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the
constitutional protection.” 69 The Court also made clear that states
must give capital defendants a “fair opportunity” to establish an
exemption based on intellectual disability. 70 Georgia stands in a
similar position of isolation as the only state to impose a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard to determine intellectual disability in the
capital context.
In two more recent cases, the Supreme Court has pushed back on
overly constraining or improper state court definitions of intellectual
disability. In Brumfield v. Cain, decided in 2015, the Court held that
a Louisiana state court’s rejection of the defendant’s request for an
Atkins hearing was based on an “unreasonable determination of the
facts” under the federal statute governing review of such claims.71
65. Id. at 1995.
66. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1991. See DSM-5, supra note 9, at 33 (“The various levels of severity are
defined on the basis of adaptive functioning, and not IQ scores, because it is adaptive functioning that
determines the level of supports required.”).
67. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1988.
68. Id. at 1996 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)), 1998.
69. Id. at 1989.
70. Id. at 2001.
71. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2273 (Jun. 8, 2015).
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The state court had based its decision in part on the fact that the
defendant received an IQ test score of 75, which it believed would
preclude a finding of intellectual disability; the Supreme Court held,
taking into account the standard error of measurement, that such a
score “was entirely consistent with intellectual disability” and did not
belie an ultimate determination of the same.72 The Louisiana court
also concluded that the record “failed to raise any question as to
Brumfield’s ‘impairment . . . in adaptive skills.’” 73 The Court
rejected this argument as well, critiquing the state court’s
characterization and interpretation of the evidence in the record.74
Just this past term, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. Texas,
another case addressing the determination of intellectual disability for
capital defendants. 75 In denying relief to Moore below, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state habeas court, which
found Moore’s Atkins claim meritorious, erred by relying on current
medical standards governing intellectual disability; instead, the Court
of Criminal Appeals held, the 1992 definition of intellectual
disability adopted in one of its earlier cases should continue to
govern Atkins claims in Texas death penalty cases.76 The Supreme
Court vacated the decision of the Texas appeals court, holding that
the standard on which it relied was an “invention” of the appeals
court, “untied to any acknowledged source,” and unsupported by the
medical community or the Court’s precedent.77 Thus, the Court held,
it “creat[ed] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual
disability will be executed.” 78 Citing Hall, the Court once again

72. Id. at 2277–78.
73. Id. at 2279.
74. Id. at 2279–81.
75. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) .
76. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). The Texas procedure also
turns on an analysis of seven court-created factors for assessing a defendant’s adaptive functioning. Ex
parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). These so-called Briseno factors, named for the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision implementing Atkins, have no basis in clinical standards. See
Stephen Greenspan, The Briseno Factors, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 219
(Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
77. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044.
78. Id. (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014)).
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emphasized that “States have some flexibility, but not ‘unfettered
discretion,’ in enforcing Atkins’ holding.”79
The Court’s decisions in Hall and Moore, even in light of its
instructions in Atkins, suggest that when certain procedures are
implemented—whether they improperly limit the definition of
intellectual disability or the evidence that can be considered in
assessing intellectual disability—they create an “unacceptable risk”
that some capital defendants may be executed in contravention of the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on executing the intellectually disabled.80
Together, these recent decisions suggest a growing concern with
states’ failures to take scientific and medical standards into account
in considering intellectual disability in the capital context.
Moreover, a close look at the Court’s decision in Leland v.
Oregon 81 suggests that Georgia’s statute is constitutionally
problematic. The Georgia Supreme Court relied on Leland—a case
involving Oregon’s beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the
context of establishing insanity—in Stripling, upholding Georgia’s
standard in the context of proving intellectual disability.82 In Leland,
Justice Clark wrote:
Today, Oregon is the only state that requires the accused,
on a plea of insanity, to establish that defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some twenty states, however, place the
burden on the accused to establish his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence or some similar measure of
persuasion. While there is an evident distinction between
these two rules as to the quantum of proof required, we see
no practical difference of such magnitude as to be
significant in determining the constitutional question we
face here. . . . Nor is this a case in which it is sought to
enforce against the states a right which we have held to be
secured to defendants in federal courts by the Bill of
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1052–53 (citing Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998).
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990.
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
Stripling v. State, 711 S.E.2d 665, 668 (Ga. 2011).
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Rights.83
Like Oregon, Georgia is the only state to impose the standard at
issue in this article and, as was the case in Leland, many other states
require only that a defendant prove intellectual disability by a
preponderance of the evidence. 84 There are, however, significant
differences between the issue in Leland and that which is the focus
here—to which the data revealed by this study are relevant. First, in
Leland, the Court appeared to rely on the fact that there was no
“practical difference [of any] magnitude” that resulted from the
application of a higher standard.85 The fact that not one defendant has
successfully met this standard post-Atkins, as demonstrated in Part II
below, suggests otherwise in the context of Georgia’s GBMR
statute.86
Second, unlike the Oregon law, Georgia’s GBMR statute does
involve the enforcement of a right included explicitly in the Bill of
Rights—the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.87 In Leland, the Court held that because the Oregon law
did not implicate such a right, “[w]e are therefore reluctant to
interfere with Oregon’s determination of its policy with respect to the
burden of proof on the issue of sanity since we cannot say that policy
violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice.”88
As others have pointed out, there is a distinction between variation in
the procedures used to prove mental retardation, which the Atkins
Court delegated to the states, and the results such procedures
produce.89 And as the Atkins Court concluded, “death is not a suitable
punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”90 To the extent such a
high standard of proof results in intellectually disabled defendants
83. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798.
84. See note 22 and accompanying text.
85. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798.
86. See infra Part II.
87. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 (2016).
88. Leland, 343 U.S. at 799.
89. O’Grady, supra note 4, at 1219 (“[Warren] Hill’s argument was focused not on the definition or
procedure in and of itself, but rather was attacking the constitutionality of the result the procedure
produces.” (emphasis in original)).
90. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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being executed in contravention of Atkins, the instant case is clearly
distinguishable from Leland.
The question whether a procedural burden imposed by the state
can lead to a constitutional violation—particularly when a
fundamental right is at stake—is not a novel one. In Cooper v.
Oklahoma,91 the Court held that Oklahoma law requiring a defendant
to prove his incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing
evidence violated due process.92 In so holding, the Court explained,
“the State’s power to regulate procedural burdens [i]s subject to
proscription under the Due Process Clause if it ‘offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”93 The Court also observed
that Oklahoma was an outlier in “[c]ontemporary practice,” as one of
only four jurisdictions in the country to require proof of
incompetence by a clear and convincing standard.94 As in Cooper,
the right implicated by Georgia’s GBMR statute is fundamental; it is
the Eighth Amendment’s fundamental prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments—in this case, the right of a capital defendant
with an intellectual disability to be exempt from execution.95 Thus,
the question with regard to Georgia’s GBMR statute, as it was in
Cooper, is whether the “State’s procedures for guaranteeing a
fundamental constitutional right are sufficiently protective of that
right.” 96 Ultimately the Court in Cooper concluded that because
Oklahoma’s procedural rule allowed the State to try a defendant who
was more likely than not incompetent to stand trial, that rule violated
due process. 97 By definition, Georgia’s procedural rule for
determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled
would also allow the execution of a defendant who more likely than
91. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
92. Id. at 355–56.
93. Id. at 367 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)).
94. Id. at 360.
95. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307, 321 (holding that the execution of persons with intellectual disability
equated to “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment).
96. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 367–68. The State in Cooper argued that the clear and convincing standard
“provide[d] a reasonable accommodation of the opposing interests of the State and the defendant”; the
Court rejected this argument. Id. at 355–56.
97. Id. at 369.
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not, under a preponderance of the evidence standard—or even
substantially more likely than not, under a clear and convincing
standard—was intellectually disabled. Indeed, Warren Hill was
executed though a habeas court found him to have met the criteria for
intellectual disability under a preponderance of the evidence
standard, as described more fully below.98 It is worth noting that, in
Cooper, the State of Oklahoma conceded during oral argument that it
could not require a defendant to prove his incompetence beyond a
reasonable doubt.99
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard imposed by Georgia to
determine death eligibility in the context of intellectual disability also
stands in tension with the historical principle that “[i]n a criminal
case . . . the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that
historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they
have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as
nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the
administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the
entire risk of error upon itself.” 100 In Addington v. Texas, in the
context of civil commitment proceedings, the Court recognized that
“given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, [the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof] may impose a burden the State
cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed
medical treatment.” 101 As intellectual disability determinations
involve similar uncertainties, they, too, are particularly ill-suited to
the highest standard of proof in our legal system. The beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof in Georgia places the likelihood
of an erroneous judgment entirely on the defendant—on a question of
life or death—and risks an execution in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Beyond the standard of proof, Georgia also stands alone in its
consideration of intellectual disability in conjunction with the guilt
phase—another feature of the statute susceptible to constitutional
98.
99.
100.
101.

See infra Part II.A.
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355 n.7.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979).
Id. at 432.
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challenge. In Georgia, the jury considers a defendant’s culpability at
the same time it considers whether the defendant meets the criteria
for intellectual disability.102 Unlike an insanity determination, which
necessarily depends on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of
the crime,103 a defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime is
not relevant to the determination of intellectual disability. 104
Generally speaking, intellectual disability is a lifelong, chronic
condition.105 Unlike an insanity determination, in which it is possible
for a defendant to be insane at the time of the crime but not
necessarily before or after the commission of the crime, a defendant
with intellectual disability will have the condition before, during, and
after the crime. For the jury to consider both issues in tandem also
departs from accepted clinical standards. 106 The AAIDD instructs
mental health practitioners not to use prior criminal acts to determine
a defendant’s level of adaptive functioning for two reasons: “First,
there is not enough available information; second, there is a lack of
normative information.”107 Courts, too, have followed this consensus
in the scientific community that past criminal behavior should have

102. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2016).
103. See O.C.G.A. § 16-3-2 (2016) (“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of
the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence.”); O.C.G.A.
§ 17-7-131 (providing that the defendant may be found “not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of
the crime” if he meets the criteria of Code section 16-3-2 or 16-3-3 at the time of the commission of the
crime).
104. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131.
105. DSM-5, supra note 9, at 39.
106. See generally AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, USER’S
GUIDE: MENTAL RETARDATION (10th ed. 2007) [hereinafter AAIDD USER’S GUIDE 2007].
107. Id. at 22; see also Stephen Greenspan & Harvey N. Switzky, Lessons from the Atkins Decision
for the Next AAMR Manual, in WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION? IDEAS FOR AN EVOLVING DISABILITY
ST
IN THE 21 CENTURY 287 (Harvey N. Switzky & Stephen Greenspan eds., 2006). Both the American
Board of Professional Neuropsychology and the National Academy of Neuropsychology have issued
recommendations that the determination of intellectual disability be made independent of the crime, as
“such issues are not consistent with established clinical and scientific procedures for the diagnosis of
mental retardation.” Letter on Behalf of Board of Directors from Leslie D. Rosenstein, Co-Dir. of Prof’l
Affairs and Info. Office, Nat’l Acad. of Neuropsychology (Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with author); Letter
from Robert J. McCaffrey, Pres. of Am. Bd. of Prof’l Neuropsychology (Mar. 19, 2003) (on file with
author). These professional bodies recognize that the facts of the offense are almost certain to distract
the factfinder from considering whether the defendant meets the criteria for intellectual disability and
can only serve to bias the process.
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little, if any, bearing on the assessment of intellectual disability.108
The jury’s determination of guilt along with a claim of intellectual
disability creates a substantial risk that the highly prejudicial
evidence concerning the capital crime will distort the jury’s decision
on intellectual disability.109
II. Study: GBMR in Georgia
The study discussed herein is the first to document, to the extent
possible, capital defendants’ inability in Georgia to meet the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard required to justify exemption from the
death penalty on the basis of intellectual disability. Part II.A provides
a brief contextual description of the need for such a study,110 and Part
II.B describes the methodology employed in undertaking the
project.111 Part II.C describes the findings from the study, including
confirmation, based on the best documentation obtainable over a twoyear period of data collection, that no defendant has proven to a jury
his intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt in the postAtkins period and only one defendant has been able to prove her
intellectual disability to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in the
nearly thirty-year history of the statute.112

108. See Hill v. Anderson, No. 4:96 CV 00795, 2014 WL 2890416, at *26 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2014)
(citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989)) (“[A] defendant could be intellectually disabled
and have sufficient insight and planning ability to deliberately kill.”); Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp.
2d 366, 395–96 (M.D. La. 2012) (“In assessing the weight to be given to criminal facts, this Court lends
great credence to the clinical admonitions that using those facts to determine adaptive skills is at best a
haphazard and risky business.”); Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1346 n.28 (N.D. Ala.
2006).
109. In approving Georgia’s bifurcated procedure in capital cases, the Court recognized the high
potential for prejudice when the jury decides two distinct legal issues in tandem:
When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have information prejudicial to the question of
guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is
more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976) (plurality opinion).
110. See infra Part II.A.
111. See infra Part II.B.
112. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Need for the Study
Until now, there has not been a comprehensive empirical
assessment of the application of Georgia’s GBMR statute in its
nearly thirty-year history. The Eleventh Circuit’s divided opinion in
Hill v. Humphrey considering the constitutionality of the statute
highlighted the need for such an assessment. 113 In her dissenting
opinion from the en banc court’s opinion, Judge Rosemary Barkett
conducted a review of published Georgia state court cases and
identified twenty-two reported murder cases involving intellectual
disability claims. 114 Of those cases, she found that only one
defendant, Christopher Lewis, had ever “successfully established his
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt” in post-conviction
proceedings before a judge, not a jury.115
There are important distinctions between the Lewis case and the
cases included in this study. First, in terms of the factfinder, scholars
have observed that juries may be “harsher in determinations of
intellectual disability [than judges] because—in the context of a
horrible crime—judges are more able to set aside their feelings and
correctly apply a legal standard than jurors.”116 Second, in terms of
the procedural posture, unless trial counsel misses evidence of a
defendant’s intellectual disability—arguably providing the basis for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim—most defendants will
raise a claim of intellectual disability at the trial level before a jury,
113. Judge Frank Hull, who authored the en banc opinion, also emphasized the lack of empirical data
during oral argument. Oral Argument at 8:11, Hill IV, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 08-15444)
(on file with author) (noting that the court had before it “no empirical data whatsoever with regard to the
effect of the burden of proof”).
114. Hill IV, 662 F.3d 1335, 1375–76, n.18 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting). These
22 cases included intellectual disability claims raised in both trial and post-conviction proceedings. In
13 of those cases, the jury rejected a GBMR verdict at trial, including Calvin Wayne Foster, Jerry
Heidler, Larry Jenkins, Warren King, William Lyons, Winston Mosher, Willie Palmer, Eric Perkinson,
Billy Raulerson, Alphonso Stripling, Jorge Torres, and Marcus Anthony Williams. All but the case of
Calvin Wayne Foster are addressed below, as the State did not seek the death penalty against Foster.
Research for this article revealed additional cases in which juries rejected GBMR beyond these thirteen,
where the result would not have been evident from the published opinion alone, and where published
opinions are not yet available.
115. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1376 n.19 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
116. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Paul Marcus & Emily C. Paavola, A Tale of Two (and
Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme
Court’s Creation of a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 411 (2014).
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not a judge. Defendants raising a claim of intellectual disability
during post-conviction proceedings will likely have a significant
advantage over those attempting to convince a jury during the guilt
phase of trial that they are intellectually disabled.
In response to Judge Barkett’s analysis, the majority cited several
reported decisions, in addition to Lewis, purporting to reveal that
defendants in Georgia have successfully met the beyond a reasonable
doubt burden of proof in establishing claims of intellectual
disability. 117 But the majority’s analysis was flawed in several
respects. First, in only one case cited by the majority, that of
Vernessa Marshall, did the jury find the defendant guilty but
mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt in a death penalty
trial—and then only in a case of felony murder. 118 Relying on a
Georgia Supreme Court opinion in his codefendant’s case, the
majority also cited the case of Gary Lee Griffin in Macon County, as
a case in which a defendant was successful in meeting the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard to show that he was intellectually
disabled. 119 In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court’s observation that
Griffin had been “adjudicated mentally retarded” was factually
incorrect. Griffin’s intellectual disability was never adjudicated in a
contested proceeding before a judge or jury; his case was resolved by
plea agreement. 120 The remaining three cases cited by the court—
Chauncey, Laster, and Moody—all involved non-capital charges.121
The fact that defendants in a handful of non-capital cases have
successfully obtained GBMR verdicts does not establish the
possibility of success in a capital trial—a fundamentally unique
proceeding. 122 A GBMR verdict does not differ in any meaningful
117. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1357.
118. Marshall v. State, 583 S.E.2d 884, 886 (Ga. 2003). Like the dissent, the majority also points to
the Lewis case as an example of a successful GBMR outcome, but again, the determination that Lewis
met the criteria for intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt occurred in post-conviction
proceedings, not before a jury.
119. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1357 (citing Walker v. State, 653 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. 2007)).
120. Felony or State Misdemeanor Sentence: Plea of Guilty But Mentally Retarded, State v. Griffin,
No. 99R-218 (Ga. Super. Ct. Macon Cnty. Aug. 25, 2000).
121. See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1357. Part III will consider the uniqueness of the Vernessa Marshall case
in closer detail. See infra Part III.
122. See Gregg v. Georgia, 482 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death is different in kind
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way from a guilty verdict in a non-capital felony trial.123 Prosecutors
thus have little reason, if any, to oppose the verdict, and occasionally
argue in favor of it. In a death penalty trial, in contrast, the GBMR
verdict can mean the difference between a life or death sentence.
Second, the majority opinion dismissed the cases cited by the dissent
in which a life sentence was ultimately imposed. 124 Ignoring these
cases sidesteps the fact that the factfinders in these cases still rejected
GBMR verdicts. Whether the defendant ultimately received a life
sentence for another reason has no bearing on the question of
whether Georgia’s statutory procedure adequately protects people
with intellectual disability from execution.
Given this incomplete information, this study aims to answer the
call in the Hill litigation to provide a comprehensive analysis of jury
decisions at the trial level when the GBMR option was submitted.125
This study provides, for the first time, an accounting of how Georgia
defendants have been unable to overcome the very high burden of
establishing intellectual disability before a jury at the guilt phase of a
capital trial—a finding that has never occurred in a case of
intentional murder.
B. Methodology
To complement the review of published cases referenced in Judge
Barkett’s dissenting opinion in Hill, this study set out to assess the
from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”). Moreover, the selection of
capital jurors based on their willingness to impose the death penalty—a process known as “death
qualification”—results in juries more likely to convict than those in non-capital cases. See, e.g., Marla
Sandys & Scott McClelland, Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death: The Failure of Death Qualification
to Ensure Impartiality, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 385 (James R. Acker et al. eds.,
2003); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital
Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 494–95 (1996); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The
Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
123. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(g)(1) (2016). While the statute provides that a defendant found to be
GBMR, once transferred to the Department of Corrections, “shall be evaluated then treated, if
indicated . . . in such manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his or her . . . mental retardation,” in
practice, the Department of Corrections evaluates all new prisoners in the same manner. See E-mail
from Bryan Wilson, Assistant Counsel, Ga. Dep’t of Corr. (July 10, 2013) (on file with author).
124. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1356.
125. Cf. id. at 1357 (“[T]he dissent’s focus on only reported appellate decisions skews its analysis.”).
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frequency of defendant success in satisfying the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard when attempting to establish intellectual disability
before a jury at the guilt phase of trial, in contrast to judicial
determinations of intellectual disability in post-conviction
proceedings.126
As there is no official database of capital cases litigated or tried in
Georgia, a database of capital cases maintained by the Georgia
Capital Defender Office (GCDO) served as a starting point for the
dataset. 127 As of July 9, 2014, that spreadsheet included 1,168
cases.128 GCDO is a part of the Georgia Public Defender Council, the
statewide agency responsible for providing constitutionally
guaranteed representation to indigent defendants. 129 The database
maintained by GCDO included every case death-noticed in Georgia
of which GCDO had knowledge, dating as far back as 1976.130
Because the GBMR determination is only relevant in cases where
guilt was determined in the course of trial, as opposed to those
resolved by plea, the database was filtered to isolate only those
capital cases that went to trial. Only those cases tried by a jury were
selected for analysis, primarily to assess how juries apply the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard—given the defendant’s entitlement
under the Sixth Amendment to a jury determination of guilt, but also
given practical considerations regarding data collection. 131
Additionally, the study omits cases tried before the GBMR statute
took effect on July 1, 1988.132 Any post-conviction remands under
126. The distinction is key in that a capital defendant seeking to prove intellectual disability for the
first time at trial faces an even greater hurdle: at trial, a jury considers together a defendant’s guilt and
intellectual disability, while a post-conviction determination of intellectual disability is divorced from
the jury’s determination of guilt. See supra Part II.A.
127. No other state agency maintains such a list. The Capital Defender database included information
about all capital cases known to be litigated in Georgia, whether or not the defendant was represented by
the Office of the Capital Defender.
128. On file with author.
129. See Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, O.C.G.A. § 17-12-1(c) (2016).
130. On file with author.
131. The explicit nature of the jury verdict form—specifying as a binary matter whether GBMR was
found or rejected—helps to demonstrate whether GBMR was actually argued and available to the jury
as an option, and could therefore provide a clear illustration of the information sought.
132. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(j) (2016) (“In the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought
which commences on or after July 1, 1988, should the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty but
mentally retarded or the jury or court find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged
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Fleming v. Zant 133 were excluded from the study because, as
described in Part I.A, defendants tried before the effective date of the
Georgia GRMR statute were held to a preponderance of the evidence
and not a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 134 Once filtered to
eliminate cases tried by a judge or otherwise resolved—for example,
nolle prossed or resolved by plea—the resulting number of cases was
379.135
Once those cases relevant to the inquiry were isolated, in October
2014, a form letter was sent to the clerk of court in each of Georgia’s
159 counties, seeking the following information: (1) confirming that
the cases specified in each letter (based on the dataset discussed
above, and listed individually for each county) included all of the
trials in that county from 1988 to the present in which the District
Attorney’s office sought the death penalty (regardless of whether or
not a death sentence was ultimately imposed); and (2) with respect to
each of the above trials, and any that may have been inadvertently
excluded, (a) a copy of the jury’s verdict form from both the guilt
phase and sentencing phase of trial and (b) the formal disposition
sheet signed by the judge and reflecting the actual sentence imposed.
Inquiries were sent to court clerks and follow up was conducted on
several different occasions for those counties that did not respond
initially. Many of the clerks responded that, either as a matter of
policy or as a matter of time and resources, they were unable to
search for the cases and documentation requested. Therefore,
but mentally retarded, the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant
to imprisonment for life.”). The decision to include or exclude a case was based on the date of death
notice or date of disposition; where the precise date was unclear, the case was included in the relevant
dataset. Similarly, where case information was incomplete—for example, if it was initially unclear
whether the case was resolved by plea or trial, or whether the death notice had been withdrawn—the
case was initially included in the relevant dataset, although it may ultimately have been screened out due
to a failure to meet the relevant criteria.
133. Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).
134. Id. at 342–43.
135. The initial dataset of capital cases initially believed to have been tried by a jury since 1988 was
larger; however, once documentation was received, cases were categorized and additional cases were
eliminated as bench trials or as pleas or alternate dispositions, including those that were nolle prossed.
In the process of obtaining documentation, lawyers or clerks indicated that four additional cases
included in this number were resolved by plea, but documentation of the same was not obtainable. This
dataset does include cases for which the ultimate means of resolution remains unknown.
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graduate research assistants traveled to many of the counties to
collect case documentation in person.
In addition to reviewing the documentation obtained in individual
cases, extensive searches through online legal databases, such as
Westlaw and Lexis, were conducted looking for cases that might
suggest that intellectual disability was a factor in the case at trial.
These search results were then cross-checked against our own dataset
to ensure that this article reviewed all capital cases in which
intellectual disability—and thus a possible verdict of GBMR—might
have been at issue.
We obtained either the verdict form, disposition sheet, or both
forms in all but seventy-four cases.136 Of those cases, as of the last
date confirmed with a court clerk, nineteen cases remained open. Of
the remaining fifty-five cases, we were able to obtain some
information regarding the sentence imposed from the Georgia
Department of Corrections website, county online docket systems,
news searches, published opinions, and contact with attorneys who
worked on the case or who had direct knowledge of the case.
Ultimately, we were able to confirm in all of the seventy-four cases
that a GBMR verdict was not returned by the jury.
Five of the fifty-five cases resulted in a verdict of not guilty.137 We
were informed of the verdict in two instances by the court clerk, in
two other instances by the online docket, and in the fifth, by the
lawyer who tried the case. In the latter case, where we were informed
of the verdict by the lawyer, the lawyer also reported that intellectual
disability was not an issue in the case.
We determined that of the remaining fifty cases in which neither
the verdict form nor the disposition had been obtained, only fourteen
defendants ultimately received a life sentence,138 which is the only
136. In three other cases, we obtained documentation in the form of orders making clear that the case
had been resolved in some way that did not implicate a GBMR verdict. In several cases, the clerk stated
that he or she was unable to locate the file.
137. Thus, the vast majority of cases included in the 379 did not involve those cases “where a
defendant offers evidence of mental retardation, but also proves he is innocent of the crime.” Hill IV,
662 F.3d 1335, 1357 (11th Cir. 2011).
138. As determined from published opinions and offender searches conducted on the Georgia
Department of Corrections website: http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/GDC/Offender/Query. Offenders were
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sentence that would have been imposed if a jury had found the
defendant GBMR.139 Based on conversations with lawyers handling
the case and with court clerks, as well as news media accounts, we
discovered that in five cases the prosecution ultimately did not seek
the death penalty or that intellectual disability was not at issue in the
case. In an additional case, the warden’s Eleventh Circuit appeal brief
revealed that the defendant pled guilty to malice murder in exchange
for the State’s agreement not to seek the death penalty. 140 In the
remaining eight cases, upon closer examination, we learned that four
defendants entered guilty pleas—two of which were entered after the
date on which we received the original dataset;141 in three cases, the
jury found the defendant guilty, not GBMR, and a life sentence was
imposed; 142 and in one additional case, the jury imposed a life
without parole sentence at trial.143

located by searching by name and county of conviction.
139. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(j) (2016) (“[S]hould the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty but
mentally retarded or the jury or court find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged
but mentally retarded, the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant
to imprisonment for life.”). Seventeen resulted in death sentences and 19 resulted in life without parole
sentences.
140. Brief on Behalf of Respondent/Appellee at 2, Hardwick v. Lewis, 35 Fed. Appx. 857 (11th Cir.
2002) (No. 01-15727), 2002 WL32160869.
141. The first defendant was Kiendal Tootle in Tattnall County. See Brief of Appellant at 2, Berry v.
State, 481 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. 1997) (No. S96A1340), 1996 WL33482275. The second defendant was
Shannon Maxwell in Stephens County. See Charlie Bauder, Toccoa Man Pleads Guilty in 2012 Murder,
WNEG (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://wnegradio.com/toccoa-man-pleads-guilty-in-2012-murder/. The third defendant was Wardell
Deloun White in Stephens County. See MJ Kneiser, Suspect in Eastanolle Double Murder Pleads
Guilty, WLHR (Aug. 14, 2015),
http://www.921wlhr.com/suspect-in-eastanolle-double-murder-pleads-guilty/. The fourth defendant was
Troy Tyree, who was originally sentenced to death. Tyree v. State, 418 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. 1992). We
learned from his attorney that he pleaded guilty to life with parole after the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed his case.
142. The first was that of Johnnie Dee Jones in his second trial in Lincoln County. See Sandy Hodson,
Palmer’s Lawyers Still Trying to Move Trial, AUGUSTA CHRON. (May 19, 1997),
http://old.chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1997/05/19/met_208558.shtml. The second was that of Maurice
Fleming in Liberty County. See Fleming v. State, 497 S.E.2d 211, 245 n.1 (Ga. 1998). The third was
that of William Webster Shields in DeKalb County. See Shields v. State, 496 S.E.2d 719, 719 n.1 (Ga.
1998). In Shields’s case, the DeKalb County court clerk told us that she could not find him in the
system, either on the computer, or in a book with all cases since 1987.
143. The defendant was Clinton Furlow in Spalding County. See Furlow v. State, 537 S.E.2d 61, 63
n.1 (Ga. 2000).
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C. Results
The final results of the study confirmed what was thought
anecdotally to be true about the impact of Georgia’s beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in the GBMR context: not one capital
defendant in Georgia has successfully obtained a jury verdict of
GBMR in a case of intentional murder in the nearly thirty-year
history of the exemption. No capital defendant has been found
GBMR by a jury at trial in the post-Atkins period. Prior to Atkins,
only one defendant—a woman, Vernessa Marshall in Clarke
County—met the standard in a felony-murder case, in other words,
murder with no intent to kill, before a jury and thus established that
she was exempt from the death penalty under Georgia’s statute.144
In thirteen cases, GBMR was listed as an option on the jury verdict
form, but was not found by the jury.145 In one of those cases, that of
Raymond Burgess of Douglas County, the trial judge identified
intellectual disability as a mitigating circumstance, 146 but the jury
ultimately found Burgess guilty and sentenced him to death.147 In one
other case, that of Jorge Torres of Evans County, a separate form was

144. Marshall v. State, 583 S.E.2d 884, 886 (Ga. 2003).
145. Raymond Burgess, Douglas County (sentenced to death); Robert Fielding, Richmond County
(sentenced to life without parole); Adrian Hargrove, Richmond County (sentenced to death); Jerry
Heidler, Toombs County (sentenced to death); Garey Kinder, Bibb County (sentenced to life without
parole); William Lyons, Monroe County (sentenced to life without parole); Winston Mosher, Camden
County (sentenced to life); Eric Perkinson, Bartow County (sentenced to death); Billy Raulerson, Jr.,
Ware County (tried in Chatham County) (sentenced to death); Bobby Lee Smith, Dougherty County
(sentenced to life); Brandon Tarver, Washington County (tried in Toombs County) (sentenced to life
without parole); Rodney Young, Newton County (sentenced to death). Jury verdict forms for these cases
are on file with the author.
In the case of Warren King, it was unclear from the verdict form alone whether GBMR was an option
for the jury. The jury verdict form left blank spaces for the jury to write its verdict as to guilt; with
regard to the felony-murder charge, the form specifies that “[i]f the verdict is ‘guilty but mentally
retarded’ or ‘guilty’ state the underlying felony.” The jury verdict form for this case is on file with the
author. The published opinion also reveals that GBMR was submitted to the jury. King v. State, 539
S.E.2d 783, 789 (Ga. 2000). Therefore, this case is included in the count of those in which GBMR was
an option but was rejected by the jury.
146. The trial judge also indicated in his report that an examination of the defendant had indicated
possible mental retardation and an IQ of 69. Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Burgess, No. CR90-1002
(Ga. Super. Ct. Douglas Cty. Feb. 28, 1994).
147. Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680, 686 (Ga. 1994).
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submitted to the jury regarding intellectual disability, and the jurors
found “[t]hat the defendant is not Mentally Retarded.”148
This tally of fourteen cases only includes the most recent verdict
and disposition forms, based on the availability of documentation.
From an exhaustive search of published opinions and conversations
with counsel, four additional cases—those of Larry Jenkins, 149
Marcus Anthony Williams, 150 Willie Palmer, 151 and Alphonso
Stripling 152 —in which a jury rejected a finding of GBMR were
discovered. In the cases of Palmer,153 Stripling,154 and Williams,155
that verdict was followed by subsequent proceedings.
The number of instances in which GBMR was submitted as an
option to the jury is likely higher than was revealed by this study,
given limitations in the documentation available for collection in
each case.156 Even with such limitations, however, the study would
not have omitted cases in which a jury found a defendant to be
intellectually disabled beyond a reasonable doubt and thus exempt
from the death penalty.157 Due to inconsistency in the jury verdict
148. Jorge Torres, Evans County (sentenced to life without the possibility of parole). The other
option, rejected by the jury, was “[t]hat the defense has established that the defendant is Mentally
Retarded beyond a reasonable doubt.” Verdict, State v. Torres, No. 98R-147 (Ga. Super. Ct. Evans Cty
Feb. 26, 1999).
149. Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 512 (Ga. 1998) (noting that Jenkins argued for a directed
verdict on his intellectual disability following the close of the culpability phase).
150. Williams v. State, 426 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. 1993) (noting the “defense’s position [at trial] that
the defendant is mentally retarded”).
151. Palmer v. State, 517 S.E.2d 502, 504–05 (Ga. 1999) (noting that, at trial, Palmer attempted to
prove intellectual disability and the jury recommended a sentence of death).
152. Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 503–04 (Ga. 1991) (noting that, during the guilt phase of trial,
the defense argued intellectual disability, but that the jury concluded that Stripling was not intellectually
disabled); see also Head v. Stripling, 590 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2003) (reversing in part lower court’s grant of
habeas corpus), cert. denied, Stripling v. Head 124 U.S. 1070 (2004) (noting that “Stripling’s counsel
presented evidence of mental illness and mental retardation” but that the jury “did not find him guilty
but mentally ill or guilty but mentally retarded”). Stripling’s case was later resolved by plea and thus
was not captured within our filtered sample. Final Disposition, State v. Stripling, No. 88CR01091 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Douglas Cty Feb. 6, 2013).
153. Schofield v. Palmer, 621 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 2005) (affirming grant of habeas corpus).
154. Head, 590 S.E.2d at 122 (Ga. 2003) (reversing in part lower court’s grant of habeas corpus),
cert. denied, Stripling v. Head 124 U.S. 1070 (2004).
155. Williams, 426 S.E.2d at 350 (reversed and remanded for further proceedings).
156. For example, it is possible that in some of the cases resulting in death, GBMR was presented as
an option and rejected by the jury, yet we were unable to obtain documentation of that fact.
157. These cases would necessarily have resulted in life sentences and all of the cases in which
documentation was not received but which did result in life sentences are addressed above in Part II.B.
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forms used from county to county, this study was not able to
ascertain the precise number of cases in which GBMR was raised and
ultimately rejected. For example, in some cases, the jury verdict form
did not provide specific options from which to choose—which might
include, for example, “guilty” and “guilty but mentally retarded”—
but instead included a blank space for the jury to complete with its
finding. 158 In the case of Willie Palmer, lawyers explained that
GBMR was argued and rejected by the jury in two capital trials—and
the published opinion following the earlier trial reveals the same159—
and yet the GBMR verdict was not submitted as an option on the
verdict form that was received from the court from the second trial in
2007. 160 Therefore, without obtaining additional documentation in
each case, it is not possible to confirm whether GBMR was never
provided to the jury as an option or if it was submitted to but rejected
by the jury. 161 The author does not suspect that any GBMR jury
findings were missed, however, because any verdict form revealing a
jury finding of GBMR could not allow for the same ambiguity.
III. GBMR in Practice
The absence of a single jury finding of intellectual disability in an
intentional murder death penalty case in the nearly three decades of
the statutory exemption, and the absence of a single jury finding of
intellectual disability in any murder case post-Atkins, leaves little
question that Georgia’s statute has failed to protect those with
intellectual disability from execution as promised, and as required by
Cf. Brad Schrade, Bartow Murder Trial Will Test Ga. Penalty Law on Retardation, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 15, 1999, at C3 (noting that by August of 1999, the GBMR defense had been invoked in 15 death
penalty cases that had proceeded to trial—all of which were unsuccessful).
158. See, e.g., Larry Jenkins, Wayne County (tried in Glynn County) (sentenced to life); Lecester
Woodall, Jr., Glynn County (sentenced to life).
159. Palmer v. State, 517 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Ga. 1999).
160. The second trial has not yet been appealed, so there is no reported decision resulting from that
case.
161. Moreover, because Georgia requires intellectual disability to be raised as part of the guilt phase,
it may create a conflict for some defense strategies and some, who might have otherwise raised it as part
of the penalty phase, may not have raised the GBMR defense as a result. Those cases obviously would
not have appeared in this sample even if the defendant(s) did have some degree of intellectual disability,
as there was no way of identifying such cases as part of this study.
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the U.S. Constitution and Georgia constitution. Highlighting several
cases where intellectual disability has been at issue, this section
considers some of the practical reasons why Georgia’s GBMR
verdict has proven, in effect, unattainable.
Almost all Atkins claims involve cases of intellectual disability in
the mild range.162 People with intellectual disability do not have any
distinguishing physical characteristics or even typical behaviors.163
Proving a case of mild intellectual disability to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt is especially difficult, given the likelihood that
defendants with mild mental retardation will not meet the jurors’
“preconceived notions of what mental retardation looks like.” 164
Georgia’s stringent procedure thus, as Judge Barkett recognized in
her dissent in Hill, “effectively limits the constitutional right
protected in Atkins to only those who are severely or profoundly
mentally retarded.”165 Prosecutors often suggest to capital juries that
a defendant’s degree of intellectual disability must be extreme in
order to meet this burden of proof.
Several cases demonstrate in stark detail how difficult it is in
practice for defendants to meet the standard set forth by Georgia law
to prove intellectual disability in a capital case. Alphonso Stripling
asserted a GBMR defense at his 1989 trial in Douglas County, the
first defendant to raise the defense following the statute’s
enactment.166 The defense presented two mental health experts who
both agreed that Stripling met the criteria for intellectual disability,
with IQ scores of 64 and 68.167 The prosecution presented an expert
162. Greenspan & Switzky, supra note 107, at 279; Frank M. Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence
Test Scores in Atkins Cases: Conceptual and Psychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91,
92 (2009); J. Gregory Olley, Knowledge and Experience Required for Experts in Atkins Cases, 16
Applied Neuropsychology 135, 136 (2009).
163. Olley, supra note 162, at 136–37.
164. Gresham, supra note 162, at 92.
165. Hill IV, 662 F.3d 1335, 1367 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Georgia
Supreme Court seems to endorse such a result. In rejecting a challenge to the burden of proof after the
Atkins decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that Georgia’s procedure “remains within
constitutional bounds” by “limit[ing] the exemption to those whose mental deficiencies are significant
enough to be provable beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hill II, 587 S.E.2d 613, 622 (Ga. 2003) (emphasis
added).
166. Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1991).
167. Order at 4–6, Stripling v. Head, No. 95-V-320 (Ga. Super. Ct. Butts Cty. Oct. 17, 2002).
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who did not conduct psychological testing of his own, and considered
the defense expert’s testing to be valid, but testified that it was his
“guestimate” that Stripling’s intelligence instead fell in the average
range.168 He also opined that Stripling could not meet the criteria for
intellectual disability because he could drive and because he held a
job as a cook at a fast food restaurant. 169 The jury failed to find
intellectual disability in Stripling’s case. 170 More than thirty years
after his trial and following a remand on the issue of intellectual
disability in state habeas proceedings, Stripling ultimately accepted a
negotiated plea to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
without ever successfully proving his intellectual disability to a
jury.171
Not long after Stripling’s trial, Raymond Burgess—one of the
defendants identified through the study as failing to meet the
standard—also raised the GBMR defense at his capital trial in
Douglas County in 1992. 172 Burgess demonstrated a history of IQ
scores ranging from 56 to 86, with all but two scores falling below
70, and a contemporary score of 69.173 Burgess scored a 65 on IQ
tests administered to him in the school system in the fifth and sixth
grades, and a 56 and a 62 on two different tests the following year.174
He received a score of 62 on an IQ test administered years later by
the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services.175 He was
socially promoted throughout his schooling, and at seventeen years
old, was still only reading at a third-grade level.176 A psychologist
retained by the defense was the only mental health expert to express
an opinion on Burgess’s intellectual disability, and he concluded that
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 9. The habeas court recognized that these conclusions were based on inaccurate stereotypes
of those with intellectual disability. Id.; see also AAIDD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 26 (listing and
dispelling common stereotypes of people with intellectual disability).
170. Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 502.
171. Plea Agreement, State v. Stripling, No. 88-1091 (Ga. Super. Ct. Douglas Cty. Feb. 6, 2013).
172. Transcript of Record at 2926–27, 2929–30, State v. Burgess, No. CR90-1002 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Douglas Cty. Feb. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Burgess Transcript].
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2926–27.
175. Id. at 2927.
176. Id. at 2929.
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Burgess met the relevant criteria.177 The prosecution did not contest
that Burgess had IQ scores below 70 in childhood. 178 The State
presented the testimony of a psychologist who had administered IQ
tests to Burgess in his teenage years, when he had obtained two
scores above 70. 179 This witness did not have an opinion as to
Burgess’s intellectual disability, instead stating, “obviously
retardation is not my area.”180 Invoking stereotypes that people with
intellectual disability have distinguishing physical characteristics, the
prosecution asked several lay witnesses if Burgess looked or seemed
“retarded” to them. 181 In closing, the prosecution suggested that
Burgess could not be intellectually disabled because he had filled out
an employment application, could “get a job in a competitive
market,” and, as in Stripling’s case, because he had held that job for a
time and obtained a driver’s license. 182 The prosecution also
suggested that the jury was free to disregard the definitions of
intellectual disability as provided in the DSM and the AAIDD
manuals. 183 The jury rejected a GBMR verdict, and Burgess was
sentenced to death.184 Burgess died of natural causes in 2012, still
under a sentence of death.185
Eric Perkinson submitted a GBMR defense to his jury in a highprofile capital case tried in Bartow County in 1999.186 Perkinson’s
school records supported an intellectual disability diagnosis.187 The
records demonstrated a history of IQ scores below 70, adaptive
functioning deficits in the mild range of intellectual disability, and
177. Id. at 4069.
178. Burgess Transcript, supra note 172, at 5093–94.
179. Id. at 4815.
180. Id. at 4843.
181. Id. at 5041.
182. Id. at 5090, 5094.
183. Id. at 5077–78.
184. Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680, 696 (Ga. 1994).
185. Mitch Sneed, ‘Golden Gun’ Killer Burgess Dies on Death Row, DOUGLAS CTY. SENTINEL (Sept.
18, 2012), http://www.douglascountysentinel.com/news/golden-gun-killer-burgess-dies-on-death-row/
article_903f95a2-eac6-53b0-8c6e-e7cc5cbbbf4b.html.
186. Retardation May Be Defense in Trial for Carjack-Murder, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Aug. 24,
1999), http://onlineathens.com/stories/082499/new_0824990015.shtml#.WKNdmrYrJE4.
187. Transcript of Record at 1881, 1939, 1941, State v. Perkinson, No. CR98-882 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Bartow Cty. Aug. 9–28, 1999) [hereinafter Perkinson Transcript].
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eventually, a classification in special education. 188 An early
childhood IQ score of 78 kept Perkinson out of special education in
his early schooling until his teachers referred him for retesting due to
his continuing academic struggles. 189 Years before trial, Georgia
Regional Hospital, on behalf of the Georgia Department of Human
Resources, determined that Perkinson met the criteria for intellectual
disability. 190 Both of Perkinson’s IQ scores, contemporaneous with
trial, were in the low-to-mid 60s.191 The initial expert hired by the
State agreed with the defense expert that Perkinson met the criteria
for intellectual disability.192 The State then sought a continuance in
the middle of jury selection to seek the opinion of another expert.193
The psychologist they hired, employed at Georgia Regional Hospital,
agreed that Perkinson’s IQ score fell in the low 60s, but suspected
Perkinson might not have put forth his best effort during her
evaluation. 194 The State also presented the testimony of a
psychiatrist, who briefly met with Perkinson and did not conduct
additional testing of her own beyond two simple screening
instruments.195 Like the State’s psychological expert, the psychiatrist
testified she could not rule out that Perkinson met the criteria for
intellectual disability, but hypothesized that Perkinson was
malingering in his test results. 196 In closing, the prosecution
attributed Perkinson’s drop in IQ from his two early childhood scores
above 70 to his subsequent scores below 70 in adolescence to a result
of the onset of conduct disorder, though “[i]t has not been diagnosed

188. Id.
189. Id. at 1868, 1876. Perkinson entered special education after additional testing, in which he
received a 73 IQ score, but an Adaptive Behavior Scale showed substantial deficits in the intellectual
disability range. Id. at 1877, 1879–80.
190. Id. at 2029.
191. Id. at 1937 (scores of 62 on the Kaufman Adult Intelligence Test and 66 on the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III) by defense expert Dr. Dennis Herendeen); Id. at 1989
(score of 61 on the WAIS-III by State expert Dr. Eilender).
192. Perkinson Transcript, supra note 187, at 1904–05.
193. Id. at 2132.
194. Id. at 1981, 1986–88.
195. Id. at 2132–34, 2026.
196. Id. at 2003, 2009, 2019.
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fully.” 197 Perkinson is still awaiting execution on Georgia’s death
row.198
Capital defendant Willie Palmer was tried twice to verdict in a
Burke County case: initially in 1997 and later in 2007, following a
reversal of his conviction and death sentence due to prosecutorial
misconduct.199 Both times the jury rejected a GBMR verdict.200 At
the 1997 trial, the defense presented testimony from a psychologist
who had evaluated Palmer in order to make a determination of
disability for the Social Security Administration ten years prior to
trial. 201 On that IQ test, Palmer scored a 61. 202 Palmer received
disability benefits on the basis of this evaluation.203 This score was
highly consistent with Palmer’s IQ score years before from the Burke
County School System—67.204 An expert retained by the defense in
connection with Palmer’s capital proceedings agreed that Palmer met
the criteria for intellectual disability.205 That expert administered a
contemporary test, on which Palmer scored a 72.206 The expert found
that Palmer met the criteria for intellectual disability. 207 On crossexamination, the prosecution suggested that the cutoff score for
intellectual disability was “whatever the jury decides the cut-off is
going to be”—given that the statute does not specify a number—and
that the jury should “end [its] inquiry” if a defendant scored between
197. Id. at 2105–06. This argument is counter to clinical norms, as the two are also not mutually
exclusive. See, e.g., Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2259, 2280 (2015) (questioning the relevance of antisocial personality disorder on the determination of petitioner’s intellectual disability).
198. GA. DEP’T OF CORR., INMATES UNDER DEATH SENTENCE (2017), http://www.dcor.state.ga.
us/sites/all/themes/gdc/pdf/death_row_2017.pdf.
199. Anne Marie Kyzer, Death Row Inmate Seeks New Trial, TRUE CITIZEN (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.thetruecitizen.com/news/2012-03-28/Front_Page/Death_row_inmate_seeks_new_trial.html;
Georgia Death Penalty Conviction Overturned Because of Prosecutorial Misconduct, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1404.
200. See infra note 228; Palmer v. State, 517 S.E.2d 502, 504, 506 (Ga. 1999) (noting that the jury
recommended a death sentence for each malice murder conviction, but also referencing a possible
verdict of “guily but mentally retarded”).
201. Transcript of Record at 1596–97, State v. Palmer, No. 96-R-43 (Ga. Super. Ct. Burke Cty. Aug.
13–24, 2007) [hereinafter Palmer First Trial Transcript].
202. Id. at 1599.
203. Id. at 1610.
204. Id. at 1605.
205. Id. at 1670.
206. Id. at 1685–86.
207. Palmer First Trial Transcript, supra note 201, at 1608.
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70 and 80, because then the person would have borderline intellectual
functioning, rather than an intellectual disability.208
At Palmer’s second trial, every expert to opine about his
intellectual disability agreed he met the criteria for intellectual
disability. 209 As in the first trial, the defense again presented the
testimony of the psychologist evaluating Palmer for the Social
Security Administration, who found Palmer to be eligible for benefits
on the basis of his intellectual disability. 210 The defense also
presented the testimony of a forensic psychologist who evaluated
Palmer prior to his second trial. 211 During this evaluation, Palmer
received a Full Scale IQ score of 63 on the WAIS-III. 212 The
psychologist testified that this current score was highly consistent
with Palmer’s IQ score in high school and his score received in
connection with his social security assessment, both obtained decades
before.213 Based on interviews with Palmer and two of his sisters, a
review of around thirty-five witness affidavits, school records, and
standardized testing, the psychologist also found that Palmer had
deficits in eight of the eleven categories of adaptive functioning, as
delineated by the DSM at the time, 214 and that the onset of his
intellectual disability occurred in the developmental period.215 At age
ten or eleven, Palmer was still unable to put on his shoes on the
correct feet without assistance. 216 As a teenager, he was unable to
read an analog clock. 217 He could not understand games other
children were playing. 218 The expert concluded Palmer met the
criteria for intellectual disability under the standard set forth in
Georgia’s statute, as well as under the standards used by the
208. Id. at 1693, 1696.
209. Transcript of Record at 1981, 2003, State v. Palmer, No. 96-R-43 (Ga. Super. Ct. Burke Cty.
Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Palmer Second Trial Transcript].
210. Id. at 1999.
211. Id. at 2103, 2106.
212. Id. at 2107, 2111.
213. Id. at 2111, 2113.
214. Id. at 2122.
215. Palmer Second Trial Transcript, supra note 209, at 2123.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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American Psychiatric Association in the DSM and by the AAIDD
(known as AAMR at the time of trial).219 Both psychologists found
that Palmer had put forth good effort during the evaluations.220
The State did not present any expert testimony in rebuttal.221 To
make its case that Palmer had not met his burden of proving
intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt, it emphasized that
the Georgia statute was not tied to the standards adopted by the APA
and AAIDD.222 The prosecution argued, “the most important thing
that you must understand is that what we do in psychology . . . is not
necessarily what we do in a courtroom.”223 The prosecution told the
jury that the scores as interpreted in psychology were irrelevant to
their determination under Georgia law:
If you want to use a number, use a number. If you don’t
want to use a number, don’t use a number. You can declare
somebody with an IQ of 130 mentally retarded in this
courtroom today. Or you can declare someone with an IQ
of 30 not mentally retarded in this courtroom today.224
The jury, in other words, was not only free to ignore, but was
encouraged to reject in whole cloth, accepted clinical standards and
could interpret the Georgia statute as it pleased.225 The prosecution
then suggested to the jury that its consideration of clinical norms
would be an insult to the victims in the case. 226 Unsupported by
expert testimony, the prosecution argued that Palmer had antisocial
personality disorder and was malingering, despite his consistency in

219. Id. at 2134.
220. Id. at 2002 (Dr. Edwin Sperr found Palmer had been “appropriately motivated” during testing);
id. at 2110 (Palmer passed two tests administered by Dr. Jonathan Venn to assess malingering).
221. Palmer Second Trial Transcript, supra note 209, at 2172.
222. Id. at 2224, 2226–27.
223. Id. at 2220.
224. Id. at 2225.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2222. The prosecutor argued, “Where does that leave Brenda Jenkins Palmer and Christine
Jenkins if you were to take that standard and apply it for forensic purposes? I submit to you that that
leaves them and their memories and their legacy and their families without any direction at all.” Id.
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scores across decades in multiple settings.227 Though the evidence of
Palmer’s intellectual disability was uncontradicted by expert
testimony, the jury rejected the GBMR verdict.228 Palmer remains on
Georgia’s death row today.229
Counsel for Warren King argued for a GBMR verdict at his 1999
trial in Appling County.230 The State’s theory was that Warren King
was not intellectually disabled, but was simply “not as well educated
as he ought to be.” 231 The evidence presented on intellectual
disability showed that King had a contemporary IQ score of 73,
which was consistent with his school records.232 King had scored a
70 on an IQ test at five years old, repeated several grades, and was in
special education throughout his schooling. 233 The State crossexamined the defense psychologist extensively. 234 In rebuttal, the
State presented an expert who testified that he was unable to make a
determination as to whether King was intellectually disabled.235 The
defense moved for a directed verdict in light of the fact that its expert
opinion, that King was intellectually disabled, stood uncontested.236
The State responded that it had “called into question the accuracy of
the testing,” leaving a conflict in the evidence.237 The court denied
the motion.238 The defense urged the jury in closing to find that King
was intellectually disabled, as no witness had rebutted its showing
that King met the legal standard.239 The prosecution suggested that
King could not be intellectually disabled because he had a driver’s

227. Palmer Second Trial Transcript, supra note 209, at 2223–24.
228. Id. at 2242.
229. GA. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 198.
230. King v. State, 539 S.E.2d 783, 789 (Ga. 2000).
231. Transcript of Record at 2119, State v. King, No. C94-10-167 (Ga. Super. Ct. Appling Cty. Sept.
14–24, 1998) [hereinafter King Transcript].
232. Id. at 2410, 2434.
233. Id. at 2480, 2514.
234. Id. at 2616–17. The defense later raised the concern with the court that the lengthy crossexamination meant that all the jury would “hear [is] reasonable doubt, reasonable doubt, reasonable
doubt.” Id.
235. Id. at 2616.
236. King Transcript, supra note 231, at 2619.
237. Id. at 2615, 2618.
238. King v. State, 539 S.E.2d 783, 798 (Ga. 2000).
239. King Transcript, supra note 231, at 2677.
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license (“You do it, any person does it, but not an MR”240), could
hold a job, knew how to dress appropriately, and knew right from
wrong.241 The prosecution emphasized that King’s current IQ score
was above 70, at 73.242 “Nowhere in [the DSM] does the word 70, 75
appear,” the prosecution argued. 243 Similar to Burgess’s case, the
prosecution suggested to the jury that they were free to ignore the
clinical definitions of intellectual disability and determine their own
definitions of “significant” and “subaverage” intellectual and
adaptive functioning. 244 The prosecution criticized the defense
expert’s unwillingness to say with 100% certainty that King’s IQ was
a specific number, rather than expressed as a range. 245 The jury
rejected a GBMR verdict.246 King remains on death row today.
At his 1996 trial in Chatham County, on Ware County charges, the
jury heard that a defense expert administered five different IQ tests to
Billy Raulerson, all of which produced consistent results: four out of
five resulted in a score below 70—the one above 70 was a 73.247 The
prosecution’s expert also obtained a score below 70—a 69—when he
administered an additional intelligence test to Raulerson. 248 The
evidence showed that Raulerson had a history of head injuries, had
repeated several grades in school, and had a history of memory and
behavioral problems. 249 As in Burgess, the prosecution did not
present the testimony of an expert who disagreed that Raulerson met
the criteria for intellectual disability. The prosecution’s expert
testified that he could not make a determination without further
information.250 The prosecution focused on two higher IQ scores, a

240. Id. at 2707.
241. Id. at 2718.
242. Id. at 2705.
243. Id. at 2716.
244. Id. at 2716–17. The prosecution challenged the credibility of professional associations, arguing
that they change definitions “all the time to fit whatever they want.” Id. at 2710–11.
245. King Transcript, supra note 231, at 2715.
246. See discussion of verdict supra note 145.
247. Transcript of Record at 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 41, 45, State v. Raulerson, No. CR94-2599-C (Ga.
Super. Ct. Chatham Cty. Mar. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Raulerson Transcript].
248. Id. at 45.
249. Id. at 188.
250. Id. at 52.
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78 and an 83, which Raulerson received during his schooling,251 and
suggested that Raulerson was now scoring lower because he was
depressed, had a long history of substance abuse, had suffered a head
injury after he was eighteen years old, and therefore would not meet
the age of onset criterion of intellectual disability, and was
malingering in order to obtain a better outcome in his case.252 The
prosecution argued that any deficits in adaptive behavior could be
explained by Raulerson’s personal choices, and the fact that some
children are raised better than others. 253 As in other cases, the
prosecution relied on Raulerson’s work history to suggest to the jury
that he could not meet the criteria for intellectual disability.254 The
jury rejected a GBMR verdict.255 Raulerson is still facing execution
on Georgia’s death row.256
William Lyons received a full scale IQ score of 69 on a test
administered in connection with his capital proceedings. 257 The
defense psychologist testified that this score was consistent with a
score of 73, received when Lyons was admitted to Charter Lake
Hospital years prior to trial.258 Lyons was illiterate—a fact he hid
from his wife for a long time because he was ashamed.259 Lyons held
the same job for twenty years as a welder and painter assistant.260 As
in Raulerson, the prosecution suggested that Lyons’s low IQ scores
and adaptive functioning deficits could be explained by his substance
abuse.261 The prosecution expert did not interview family members,
employers, or school personnel, but ruled out any adaptive
functioning deficits, in part, because of Lyons’s stable employment

251. The defense expert considered these scores consistent with Raulerson’s current scores, when
corrected for outdated norms. Id. at 189.
252. Id. at 88, 89, 144, 150–51.
253. Raulerson Transcript, supra note 247, at 147.
254. Id. at 148–49.
255. See Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791, 795 (Ga. 1997).
256. GA. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 198.
257. Transcript of Record at 1228, State v. Lyons, No. 95-CR-18 (Ga. Super. Ct. Monroe Cty. May
20, 1997) [hereinafter Lyons Transcript].
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1085.
260. Id. at 1090–91.
261. Id. at 1229.
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history.262 The prosecution suggested in closing that Lyons could not
meet the criteria for intellectual disability because he could speak in
coherent sentences during his police interrogation: “Nothing retarded
about that.” 263 The prosecution countered the evidence of Lyons’s
illiteracy with the argument that he was able to sign his name.264 The
prosecution urged the jury to reject the intellectual disability defense
because both the defense and prosecution experts testified that Lyons
knew the difference between right and wrong.265 The jury rejected
the GBMR verdict; at sentencing, it imposed a life without parole
sentence.266
Robert Fielding presented the testimony of two psychologists at
his 1996 trial in Richmond County in support of a GBMR verdict.267
The psychologist retained by the defense administered six different
IQ measures on Fielding, all of which fell within the range of
intellectual disability. 268 Fielding had been placed in special
education in school and classified as “retarded.”269 Psychologist Dr.
David Peterson, from Georgia Central State Hospital, originally
evaluated Fielding at the State’s request, but was called by the
defense at trial.270 Dr. Peterson had no doubt that Fielding met the
criteria for intellectual disability.271 Prior to trial, the defense asked
the court to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty because
all mental health experts in the case agreed that Fielding met the
criteria for intellectual disability.272 Opposing the motion, the State
argued that the “medical standard [used by the APA and the AAIDD]
in no way whatsoever has been adopted by, has not been adhered to,
has not been used in legal proceedings with regard to determination
262. Id. at 1235, 1241.
263. Lyons Transcript, supra note 257, at 1428.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1429.
266. Lyons v. State, 522 S.E.2d 225, 227 (Ga. 1999).
267. Transcript of Record at 19, 50, State v. Fielding, No. 94-RCCR-610 (Ga. Super. Ct. Richmond
Cty. Sept. 16–20, 1996) [hereinafter Fielding Transcript].
268. Id. at 28.
269. Id. at 922–23.
270. Id. at 972.
271. Id. at 974.
272. Id. at 15.
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of mental retardation in any way whatsoever.”273 The court denied
the motion.274 Later before the jury, during its cross-examination of
defense expert Dr. Daniel Grant, the State asked if Dr. Grant, in using
clinically accepted determinations of intellectual disability—and
specifically in considering IQ scores below 70 as falling within the
range of intellectual disability—was present to “superimpose a
medical standard over a legal standard that contains no numerical
value here.”275 The jury did not find that Fielding was intellectually
disabled and returned a guilty verdict.276 It imposed a sentence of life
without parole at the sentencing phase.277
Jorge Torres, charged in Long County and tried in Evans County,
also asserted a GBMR defense at trial.278 Torres had been placed in
special education in the Philadelphia School system and “diagnosed
as mildly mentally retarded.” 279 A defense expert administered
several IQ tests with scores ranging from 58 to 65.280 The expert for
the defense concluded that Torres was intellectually disabled.281 The
State’s expert, who had administered a screening test, rather than a
comprehensive instrument on intellectual functioning, concluded that
Torres did not meet the criteria for intellectual disability. 282 The
prosecution, as in many other cases discussed above, highlighted the
fact that Torres had a driver’s license, could drive, and could hold a
job as evidence that he could not be intellectually disabled.283 The
State also suggested that Torres had manipulated the defense expert’s
testing results in an attempt to prove intellectual disability and
emphasized the fact that Torres “has received no treatment of any
kind or any mental evaluation since grade school.” 284 The jury
273. Fielding Transcript, supra note 267, at 16.
274. See Fielding v. State, 602 S.E.2d 597, 599 n.1 (Ga. 2004).
275. Fielding Transcript, supra note 267, at 926, 930.
276. See Fielding, 602 S.E.2d at 599 n.1.
277. Id.
278. Transcript of Record at 44, State v. Torres, No. 98-R-147 (Ga. Super. Ct. Long Cty. Feb. 26,
1999) [hereinafter Torres Transcript].
279. Id. at 1143.
280. Id. at 1153.
281. Id. at 1154.
282. Id. at 88.
283. Id. at 48.
284. Torres Transcript, supra note 278, at 45.

2017]

GEORGIA'S BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

597

rejected a GBMR verdict. 285 In the sentencing phase, it returned a
verdict of life imprisonment without parole.286
One must also consider the case of Vernessa Marshall, the one
death penalty case in which the jury returned a verdict of GBMR,
prior to Atkins, with regard to a felony-murder charge, and the
singular qualities of that case. Marshall and her boyfriend Demetrius
Paul were charged with the intentional murder of Marshall’s tenyear-old son Jamario in Clarke County. 287 Jamario died of
complications after being struck repeatedly on his bottom by a
belt.288 It was undisputed that Paul inflicted almost all of the injuries
against Jamario in an effort to punish him for misbehavior at school,
and that Marshall had assisted Paul in holding Jamario down.289 It is
important to note from the outset that the prosecution submitted both
malice murder and felony-murder, with cruelty to a child as the
underlying felony, charges to the jury, but the jury, rejecting the
intent finding required for malice murder, returned a felony-murder
verdict.290 Marshall’s defense counsel did not believe that the facts
surrounding the death of Marshall’s son warranted capital charges in
the first place. 291 At trial, counsel urged the jury to find Marshall
“guilty but mentally retarded” of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser
included offense of malice murder. 292 The jury rejected malice
murder, finding Marshall guilty instead of felony murder and finding
her “guilty but mentally retarded” beyond a reasonable doubt. 293
285. Verdict, State v. Torres, No. 98R-147 (Ga. Super. Ct. Evans Cty Feb. 26, 1999).
286. Id.
287. Greg Martin, Marshall Jury Back: Mom Gets Life in Son’s Death, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD
(Sept. 22, 1999), http://onlineathens.com/stories/092299/new_marshallguilty.shtml#.WKTUIUbyQug;
Transcript of Record at 1794–95, State v. Marshall, No. SU-98-CR-0290-J (Ga. Super. Ct. AthensClarke Cty. Sept. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall Transcript].
288. Marshall Transcript, supra note 287, at 1795.
289. Id. at 1797, 1799.
290. Order, State v. Marshall, No. 98-CR-0290-J (Ga. Super. Ct. Athens-Clarke Cty. Sept. 22, 1999);
Verdict, State v. Marshall, No. 98-CR-0290-J (Ga. Super. Ct. Athens-Clarke Cty. Sept. 22, 1999).
291. Marshall Transcript, supra note 287, at 1808–09.
292. Id. at 1817.
293. Verdict, supra note 290. In assessing the jury’s unique decision in the case, Marshall’s gender
must also be taken into consideration, as capital jurors are generally much more reluctant to impose a
death sentence against women. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed against men and not
women.”); Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine
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Marshall’s case was exceptional with regard to the prosecution’s
decision to try the unintentional death of a child as malice murder. In
many respects, Vernessa Marshall’s case was also exceptional in
terms of the evidence of intellectual disability available to the
defense. Marshall was classified early in her schooling by the Clarke
County School System as a person with an intellectual disability.294
At ten years old, she was still sucking her thumb and wetting the
bed. 295 At trial, the prosecution did not contest that Marshall had
developmental delays or that her IQ scores fell within the range of
intellectual disability.296 The two psychologists who testified in the
case—one for the defense and one for the court—agreed that
Marshall met the criteria for intellectual disability. 297 To rebut
Marshall’s showing of intellectual disability, the State did not present
a psychologist of its own but instead a psychiatrist who conceded that
Marshall met the first—significantly subaverage deficits in
intellectual functioning—and third—age of onset—criteria of
intellectual disability but did not meet the second criterion—deficits
in adaptive behavior. 298 The State’s expert admitted that she had
limitations in her own expertise as it related to intellectual
functioning.299
Very few cases involving intellectual disability present such a
clear evidentiary picture of intellectual disability as Marshall’s. In her
Hill dissent, Judge Barkett observed that intellectual disability “is a
medical condition that is diagnosed only through, among other
things, a subjective standard that requires experts to assess
intellectual functioning and to interpret the meaning of behavior long
Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 435 (2002) (noting “substantial evidence suggests jury bias in favor of
female defendants in capital cases”). Women make up less than 2% of the country’s death row
population. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, DEATH ROW U.S.A. 1 (2016),
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Winter_2016.pdf. Only sixteen women have been
executed in the United States since the 1976 reinstatement of the death penalty—comprising just over
1% of all executions in that period. Id. at 7.
294. Marshall Transcript, supra note 287, at 1851.
295. Id. at 1813.
296. Id. at 1804.
297. Id. at 1854, 1856.
298. Id. at 1382, 1412–13.
299. Id. at 1452.
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into the offender’s past,” making the possibility of mistaken factfinding under this standard a “near certainty.”300
Given the subjective nature of the diagnosis, intellectual disability
cases are more susceptible to challenge under the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. 301 In clinical practice, mental health
experts would typically diagnose intellectual disability to a
reasonable degree of medical or professional certainty. 302 They
would not be asked to determine that a person meets the diagnosis
beyond any reasonable doubt. 303 Though the reasonable degree of
medical certainty is used in clinical practice, prosecutors could
argue—and jurors could agree—that this level of certainty is
insufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof.304 The Hall Court held that it “is not sound to view a single
factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment.”305
Yet, as shown in the cases discussed above, this is what the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard—and prosecutors relying on it—
encourage juries to do.306
Retrospective diagnoses of intellectual disability, almost always
required in the capital context given the nature of the litigation,
present obstacles susceptible to challenge by the prosecution under
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.307 Often, school and other
critical records that would have supported a childhood diagnosis of
intellectual disability are no longer available.308 For instance, capital
defendant Rodney Young submitted a GBMR defense to the jury in
his capital trial in Newton County.309 Like Marshall, Young had been
placed in special education due to his intellectual disability
300. Hill IV, 662 F.3d 1335, 1371–72 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
301. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1372.
302. Glenn E. Bradford, Dissecting Missouri’s Requirement of “Reasonable Medical Certainty”, 57
J. Mᴏ. B. 136, 141 (2001).
303. Id.
304. Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1372.
305. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
306. See supra notes 166–305 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 300–304 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., infra notes 309–314 and accompanying text.
309. Transcript of Record at 3319–20, State v. Young, No. 2008-CR-1473-3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Newton
Cty., Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Young Transcript].
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throughout his school career, but the school had long ago destroyed
the records showing his results on intelligence and adaptive
functioning instruments.310 Without the benefit of the records, Young
was only able to present the testimony of teachers and the head of the
high school special education department as evidence that Young had
met the criteria for intellectual disability.311 Capitalizing on the fact
that the records no longer existed, the prosecution suggested that the
teachers’ testimony about Young’s history in special education was
biased because they cared for him, thus planting a seed of doubt for
the jury.312 The jury rejected a GBMR verdict for Young, and he was
sentenced to death. 313 Young remains under sentence of death on
Georgia’s death row.314 Another obstacle can arise when the school
system did not, for whatever reason, classify the defendant as
intellectually disabled. 315 In the William Lyons case in Monroe
County, the prosecution criticized the defense expert for making a
determination of intellectual disability when there were no
documented IQ scores before Lyons was eighteen years old.316 Lyons
had attended a segregated school and was socially promoted
throughout his schooling. 317 Similarly, in the Raulerson case, the
prosecution argued that the failure of the school system to diagnose
Raulerson as intellectually disabled was dispositive on the question
of intellectual disability.318
310. Id.
311. Id. at 2847–2992.
312. Id. at 3270. The prosecution argued:
I’m not saying you can’t just take the teachers’ word about it. But remember, the
defense has to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. So if you were to return a
verdict that he’s guilty but mentally retarded because some teachers said, 20 years
ago we thought maybe he had this test that said that, you know, is that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt?
Id.
313. Id. at 3351.
314. GA. DEPT. OF CORR., supra note 198.
315. The AAIDD User’s Guide informs practitioners to “[r]ecognize that a number of reasons might
explain the lack of an earlier, official diagnosis of ID, including,” among other things, the many
considerations that may prevent a school diagnosis of intellectual disability. AAIDD USER’S GUIDE
2012 supra note 32, 20 tbl.3.3.
316. Lyons Transcript, supra note 257, at 1129–30.
317. Id. at 1157.
318. Raulerson Transcript, supra note 247, at 152, 171–72.
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Adding to the challenges that often accompany a retrospective
diagnosis, family members and other reporters may have trouble
recalling a defendant’s specific abilities in the developmental period
and may be impaired themselves. People with intellectual disability
and their family members also tend to mask the person’s
limitations.319 For this reason, the AAIDD cautions practitioners to
recognize the high risk of error in self-reporting.320 Yet, state experts
routinely evaluate defendants for intellectual disability without
speaking to anyone besides the defendant. 321 Prosecutors can then
argue that the defendant is malingering.322 Though the defense expert
in the Warren King case had interviewed his sister in conducting his
assessment of King’s adaptive functioning, the prosecution in closing
challenged her as a biased witness and argued that King was
malingering.323
Though accepted clinical norms exist, many aspects of an
intellectual disability evaluation are ripe for challenge by the
prosecution under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 324 For
instance, an IQ score is not a precise number. 325 As the Supreme
Court has recognized, established medical practice states that IQ
scores should be expressed within a range to account for the standard
error of measurement.326 Mental health professionals must also take
other factors into consideration in assessing an individual’s
intellectual functioning. 327 Georgia prosecutors frequently invoke
319. Tammy Smith et al., Individuals with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in the
Criminal Justice System and Implications for Transition Planning, 43 EDUC. & TRAINING IN
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 421, 425 (2008).
320. AAIDD USER’S GUIDE 2007, supra note 106, at 21.
321. See infra note 323.
322. Id.
323. King Transcript, supra note 231, at 2701. The prosecution argued, “We don’t have adaptive
problems from an independent source.” Id. at 2706.
324. See Hill IV, 662 F.3d 1335, 1357 (11th Cir. 2011).
325. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014) (“The professionals who design, administer, and
interpret IQ tests have agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed
number but as a range.”).
326. AAIDD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 36; DSM-5, supra note 9, at 37; see also Hall, 134 S. Ct. at
1995; Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017).
327. These include the individual’s culture and ethnicity, the Flynn Effect (the observation that IQ
scores rise in the population over time) and practice effects (how many times and with what frequency
an individual has taken a certain test). AAIDD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 37–38; AAIDD USER’S GUIDE
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arguments about the standard error of measurement to suggest
reasonable doubt in intellectual disability cases.328 The prosecution in
Vernessa Marshall’s case made this argument, albeit unsuccessfully:
“Doctor Miller[,] who was the defense’s expert[,] found that Ms.
Marshall had an IQ of 65. Plus or minus 5 immediately knocks her up
to 70. She may or may not meet the criteria.” 329 The prosecution
pressed the defense expert extensively in Warren King’s case to give
King an IQ score at a level of 100% certainty, and then highlighted in
closing the expert’s unwillingness to say with 100% certainty that
King’s IQ was one specific number, instead only expressing it as a
range, in accordance with clinical norms.330 The prosecution urged
jurors to accept a bright line IQ score cutoff of 70; in other words,
suggesting that they should reject a claim of intellectual disability for
a defendant with scores over 70.331 The prosecution in the Raulerson
case similarly asked the defense expert to commit to a level of 100%
certainty in expressing Raulerson’s range of possible IQ scores.332 In
closing, it suggested that a reasonable doubt existed because
“psychologists cannot be sure, cannot be certain of IQ.”333
Also clouding the determination are often misconceived notions of
what individuals with an intellectual disability can or cannot do.334
The American Association of Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities has explained that there are a number of incorrect
stereotypes—”unsupported by both professionals in the field and
published literature”—that can lead to inaccurate legal
conclusions.335 Such incorrect stereotypes may suggest that persons
with intellectual disability look and talk differently from others, are
completely incompetent, cannot get a driver’s license or drive a car,
cannot acquire vocational and social skills necessary to live
2012, supra note 32, at 22–24; AAIDD USER’S GUIDE 2007, supra note 106, at 20–21.
328. See infra notes 329–333 and accompanying text.
329. Marshall Transcript, supra note 287, at 1894.
330. King Transcript, supra note 231, at 2453–56, 2500, 2715.
331. Id. at 2705.
332. Raulerson Transcript, supra note 247, at 128.
333. Id. at 143.
334. AAIDD USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 32, at 25–26.
335. Id.
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independently, and cannot support a family, 336 as the prosecution
insinuated in many of the case examples discussed above.
Imposing such a high standard of proof allows prosecutors to
emphasize a defendant’s strengths to negate evidence of adaptive
functioning deficits, when accepted clinical norms dictate that
strengths should not negate weaknesses. 337 Indeed, the Supreme
Court expressed disapproval of such a practice in Moore.338 In the
Marshall case, for instance, even after conceding that Marshall had
developmental delays prior to the age of eighteen and that her IQ
scores were within the range of intellectual disability, the prosecution
argued that the way Marshall interacted with police in her recorded
statement proved that she did not meet the criteria for intellectual
disability. 339 The State’s argument shows how easy it is for
prosecutors to inject doubt into the jury’s consideration of intellectual
disability:
The State has no burden as to mental retardation. All we
have to do—we didn’t have to do anything. But by showing
the video we could have said hey, y’all saw the video. Does
that match what these doctors say? And that’s a reasonable
doubt. That we have respected professionals differing in
this area is a reasonable doubt.340
Vernessa Marshall, of course, is not the only capital defendant
with intellectual disability to face trial in Georgia since the enactment
of the statute in 1988.341 The many unique circumstances of her case
suggest that the jury’s finding of intellectual disability beyond a
336. Id.
337. AAIDD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 7 (“‘Within an individual, limitations often coexist with
strengths.’ This means that people with ID are complex human beings who likely have certain gifts as
well as limitations. Like all people, they often do some things better than others.”).
338. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
“overemphasized Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths” in rejecting his intellectual disability claim).
339. Marshall Transcript, supra note 287, at 1828–31.
340. Id. at 1893.
341. See, e.g., Ga. Inmate with Intellectual Disability Set to Die Tonight, CBS NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016,
8:05
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/georgia-inmate-intellectual-disability-kenneth-fultsexecution/.
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reasonable doubt was an anomaly—not proof that the GBMR
standard sufficiently protects those with intellectual disability.342 On
a national level, scholars estimate that Atkins claims are filed at a rate
of 7.7% among death penalty cases.343 Assuming a similar filing rate
in Georgia, one would expect to see claims in approximately twentynine of the cases considered in this study.344
A precise success rate in Georgia is impossible given the
limitations of the dataset as noted above, yet there can be no doubt
that Georgia’s record is poor on its own, and poor relative to the rest
of the country. 345 Considering slightly different data, Blume’s
research suggested “an overall ‘success’ rate” of Atkins claims across
the country from 2002–2013 to be 55%.346 Blume, too, found that
Georgia’s success rate in Atkins cases was “strikingly low” at 11%.347
This study, based on a comprehensive review of capital cases tried to
a jury from 1988 to 2014 reveals an even lower rate of success in that
period, at a rate of 5.0%. This figure uses as a denominator twenty
GBMR submissions to the jury—fifteen in which documentation
from the study was available, four in which information was obtained
from published opinions, and in the case of Willie Palmer’s second
trial, a discussion with counsel, given that there is not yet a published
opinion in the case. As discussed above in Part II, there may have
been even more cases in which GBMR was an option but was
rejected by the jury, which would further reduce the success rate. The
rate of successful GBMR verdicts in death penalty cases post-Atkins
is zero. The rate of successful GBMR verdicts in a case of malice
murder in the entire history of Georgia’s GBMR statute is zero.
342. See Marshall Transcript, supra note 287, at 1794–1902.
343. Blume et al., supra note 116, at 396. Justice Scalia warned in dissent in Atkins that the Court’s
new constitutional rule exempting people with intellectual disability would open the floodgates to
meritless claims. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353–54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Blume and his
co-authors persuasively show that Justice Scalia’s fears never materialized. Blume et al., supra note 116,
at 396.
344. Blume et al., supra note 116, at 396.
345. See id. at 412.
346. Id. at 397. Blume’s data on intellectual disability claims comprised of reported decisions and
anecdotal information from capital defense practitioners in post-Atkins cases, and included postconviction determinations of intellectual disability not considered in this study. The study did not
purport to be a comprehensive analysis of all jury decision-making at the trial level as attempted here.
347. Id. at 412.
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After decades of litigation challenging the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, Warren Hill was executed on January 27, 2015.348 At
the time of his execution, all mental health experts who had ever
evaluated Hill—on both the defense and prosecution sides—agreed
that he met the criteria for intellectual disability. 349 Hence Judge
Barkett’s warning in Hill’s case that Georgia’s statute “ensures that
some, if not many, mentally retarded offenders will be executed in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”350
CONCLUSION
From an empirical perspective, we can now say with confidence
that not one defendant in Georgia has proven successfully to a jury
post-Atkins that he is exempt from the death penalty due to
intellectual disability. The Georgia procedure’s uniquely high
standard of proof and consideration of intellectual disability during
the guilt phase stand as outliers in the nation, and deny capital
defendants “a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits
their execution.”351 With its decisions in Hall v. Florida and Moore v.
Texas, the Supreme Court has reinvigorated its commitment to
categorical exemption from the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment for offenders with intellectual disability. Like the
Florida procedure found unconstitutional in Hall,352 and the standard
applied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to define intellectual
disability in Moore, 353 Georgia’s procedure is out-of-step with the
national consensus. While Atkins left to the states the task of
348. Stephanie Gallman, Georgia Executes Man Despite Disability Claim, CNN (Jan. 28, 2015, 7:48
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/27/us/georgia-inmate-warren-hill-tuesday-execution.
349. Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Georgia Sets Execution Date Despite Unanimous
Findings of Mental Retardation and Pending Supreme Court Review (July 8, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/DPICHillPR.pdf.
350. Hill III, 608 F.3d 1272, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010).
351. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
352. Id. at 1998 (“In summary, every state legislature to have considered the issue after Atkins—save
Virginia’s—and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to that of
Florida.”).
353. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017) (“The Briseno factors are an outlier, in
comparison both to other States’ handling of intellectual-disability pleas and to Texas’ own practices in
other contexts.”).
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implementing procedures to exempt those with an intellectual
disability from execution, Hall and Moore leave no question that a
state’s discretion has constitutional limits. 354 When given the
opportunity, the United States Supreme Court should consider—or
the Georgia Supreme Court should reconsider—Georgia’s
unconstitutional barrier to relief, which makes it all but certain that
people with intellectual disabilities, like Warren Hill, will be
executed. In the meantime, the Georgia legislature should end its
thirty-year failed experiment and enact legislation designed to
comply with the Constitution and protect those with intellectual
disability from execution.355

354. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998 (“Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full
scope of the constitutional protection.”).
355. See id. at 2001 (“The States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not
deny the basic dignity the Constitution protects.”).
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APPENDIX

State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
North
Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma

State Standard Chart
Standard
Preponderance of the evidence
Clear & convincing evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Clear & convincing evidence
Clear & convincing evidence
Beyond a reasonable doubt
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Not specified by statute or case
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
None stated
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
None stated
Clear & convincing evidence (pretrial);
Preponderance of the evidence (sentencing)
Preponderance of the evidence
Clear & convincing evidence (pretrial);
Preponderance of the evidence (sentencing)
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Oregon
Pennsylvania
South
Carolina
South
Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming

None stated
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
None stated
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